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SEC REGULATORY ANALYSIS:  
“A LONG WAY TO GO AND  
A SHORT TIME TO GET THERE”1 
Jerry Ellig* & Hester Peirce** 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC or 
Commission) regulates the U.S. securities markets. Its rules affect the 
participants in those markets, including retail investors and public 
companies. SEC rules are supposed to help protect investors, facilitate 
capital formation, and foster fair, orderly, and efficient markets. The SEC 
writes disclosure rules for public companies and oversees the activities of 
over 20,000 financial firms, including investment advisers, mutual funds 
and other exchange-traded funds, broker-dealers, national securities 
exchanges, credit-rating agencies, and a number of financial market utilities 
and quasi-governmental regulators. 
Given that SEC rules can have sweeping effects on the U.S. economy, 
the role of economic analysis in shaping those rules is crucial. Without an 
evidence-based assessment of the problem the Commission seeks to solve 
and the pros and cons of alternative solutions, the Commission would be 
flying blind. Recognizing this reality, Congress included in the SEC’s 
authorizing legislation a requirement that the Commission conduct 
economic analysis when it determines whether new rules are in the public 
interest. Federal appeals courts have vacated several SEC rules due to 
inadequate economic analysis. The SEC, pledging to do better, published 
staff economic analysis guidance in March 2012 that covers many of the 
same topics executive branch agencies are expected to address in 
Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) of major regulations. 
Considering the controversy generated by recent court cases, an 
evaluation of economic analysis in SEC regulations is highly timely. This 
Article critically examines the quality and use of economic analysis in 
seven major final rules promulgated by the SEC prior to the issuance of its 
March 2012 staff economic analysis guidance, as well as one major rule 
issued after the new guidance. We apply the Mercatus Center’s Regulatory 
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Report Card, a standardized scoring system employed in published research 
on executive agency rulemaking, to assess the regulatory analysis 
conducted in connection with these SEC rulemakings. The scoring system 
allows us to compare the quality and use of economic analysis at the SEC 
with the standards that guide executive branch agencies and with executive 
branch agencies’ actual performance. 
Important as the SEC is, our study holds implications beyond SEC 
rulemaking. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (Dodd-Frank) granted significant new responsibilities and regulatory 
authority to numerous financial regulators, including the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (the CFTC), the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, and the newly created Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection (the CFPB). Dodd-Frank charged these regulators with 
writing new rules governing, among other things, the over-the-counter 
derivatives markets, mortgage origination, and the interconnected activities 
of large financial institutions. Sound regulation of financial markets and 
market participants based on accurate information and rigorous analysis can 
help to prevent a future financial crisis. The Government Accountability 
Office recently identified inadequacies in economic analysis conducted by 
multiple financial regulatory agencies.2 An examination of the role of 
economic analysis in SEC rulemaking could reveal best practices from 
which other agencies could learn or highlight significant pitfalls they should 
avoid in economic analyses of their own rules. In addition, looking at how 
the SEC has interpreted its statutory rulemaking obligations can provide 
insights for Congress as it considers various regulatory reform bills 
designed to foster the use of economic analysis in agency decision-making. 
Our principal findings suggest that the SEC’s decision to adopt new 
economic analysis guidance was a necessary and appropriate response to 
the significant flaws in its previous economic analysis: 
• The economic analysis accompanying most of these regulations 
was seriously incomplete and rarely used. The SEC regulation we 
examined that scored the highest on the Mercatus Regulatory Report Card 
earned just 20 out of 60 possible points, or 33%. The highest score for use 
of analysis was just 5 out of 20 possible points, or 25%. 
• The SEC regulations we examined scored well below executive 
branch regulations proposed in 2010–11. Executive branch regulations 
earned an average of 29.7 out of 60 possible points (50%), suggesting that 
many Regulatory Impact Analyses from executive branch agencies are 
seriously incomplete. But the SEC regulations averaged just half this 
score—15.7 out of 60 possible points (26%). Similar results occur when we 
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compare the analysis for SEC regulations with the analysis for financial 
regulations issued by executive branch agencies. 
• The SEC regulations scored much more poorly than executive 
branch regulations on the Report Card criteria most directly relevant 
to the topics in the SEC’s March 2012 economic analysis guidance. On 
average, executive branch agencies earned more than twice the score of the 
SEC regulations on the criteria the SEC has identified as crucial for a good 
economic analysis. 
• The pre-2012 SEC analyses often failed to seriously assess the 
problem the regulation was supposed to solve. For example, the SEC 
promulgated a rule requiring certain broker-dealers to establish risk 
management controls based on an intuited—rather than evidence-based—
fear that broker-dealers might not be employing proper risk controls. In 
addition, the SEC required public companies to hold votes related to 
executive compensation without looking at whether state law, which has 
traditionally governed such matters, was working properly. The SEC also 
suggested in that same rulemaking that shareholders were already getting 
much of the information that would be required in the rule’s new 
disclosures, which begs the question of why the rule is needed. 
• The pre-2012 SEC analyses often ignored important 
alternatives that should be obvious to an expert agency. The SEC’s 
rulemaking to implement its new whistleblowing regime, for example, 
could have looked at alternatives based upon some of the many other state 
and federal whistleblowing programs. The SEC’s large trader reporting rule 
could have assessed the alternative approach of obtaining the needed 
information through the consolidated audit trail, a separate rulemaking with 
broader, but similar, objectives. Alternatives to new hedge fund reporting 
requirements might have included enhanced requirements on private parties 
to monitor hedge funds. 
• The pre-2012 SEC analyses often ignored significant costs. In 
drafting the whistleblower rule, the SEC downplayed the significant 
damage that it could do to companies’ internal control systems by 
encouraging employees to view the SEC as the first place to go when they 
discover a potential problem at their companies. In the rulemakings related 
to hedge fund adviser registration and new hedge fund disclosures, the SEC 
did not take into account costs to itself and the risks created by decreased 
private-sector monitoring in response to a perception of increased 
government monitoring of hedge funds. 
• The pre-2012 SEC analyses often asserted significant benefits 
without providing evidence that the regulation was likely to achieve 
them. In the rulemaking instituting the new Form PF, the SEC asserted that 
there would be financial stability benefits from all the new information that 
the Financial Stability Oversight Council would have at its disposal, 
without explaining how that would happen. Similarly, the large trader 
364 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 8 
rulemaking simply assumes that the SEC, armed with the new information 
required by the rule, will be a better regulator. 
• It is too early to tell whether the new economic analysis 
guidance is working. We conducted a Report Card evaluation of one 
rulemaking that was finalized after the economic analysis guidance was put 
into place. The results from that rulemaking show little improvement in the 
quality of analysis. This rule achieved about the same total, openness, 
analysis, and use scores as the seven pre-2012 SEC rules, but did score 
slightly better than the average pre-2012 SEC rule for analysis of the 
baseline and alternatives. However, because the SEC has only promulgated 
a handful of major rules with the full benefit of the guidance, it is too early 
to conclude whether the analysis is improved. The guidance represents an 
important milestone for the SEC, and as the agency gains more experience 
applying them, there is reason to be optimistic that its analysis will 
improve. 
We begin in Part I with a discussion of why regulatory analysis matters, 
the economic analysis requirements faced by the SEC, and the 
Commission’s struggles with those requirements. Part II describes the rules 
that we have chosen to analyze. Part III reports the results of the evaluations 
of the rules using the Report Card and compares the regulatory analysis 
conducted by the SEC, an independent regulatory agency, with the analysis 
conducted by executive branch agencies. In Part IV, we suggest how the 
SEC could have improved its economic analysis using scholarly literature 
and data that should be readily available to the Commission. Part V 
analyzes one rule that was adopted after the SEC staff guidance took effect 
and considers other indicators of how the SEC’s regulatory analysis has 
changed since the guidance’s effective date. We conclude with a discussion 
of the implications of getting the analysis wrong and some suggestions for 
how the SEC can improve its analysis. 
I. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: IT’S NOT JUST A GOOD IDEA; IT’S 
THE LAW 
The SEC, an independent regulatory agency, is not subject to the same 
economic analysis requirements applicable to executive agencies.3 A series 
of executive orders has required executive agencies to perform regulatory 
analysis as part of their rulemaking process.4 The Office of Management 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012) (listing independent regulatory agencies, including the 
SEC); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, § 3(b) (1993–2000), reprinted as amended in 5 
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 802–06 (2012) (defining “agency” as any authority of the United States that 
is an “agency” under 44 U.S.C. § 3502(1), other than those considered to be independent 
regulatory agencies). 
 4. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 601 app. at 816–17 (2012); Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 3; Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 
C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 431–34 (1982). 
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and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) reviews 
these regulatory impact analyses.5 The question of whether the President 
should and could extend the executive orders and OIRA review obligations 
to independent regulatory agencies has been debated for some time, but no 
President has sought to do so.6 
Although the executive orders have not, to date, been extended to the 
SEC, the SEC has statutory analysis requirements. Most important among 
these obligations is a requirement that whenever the SEC has to consider 
whether a rulemaking is consistent with the public interest, the agency must 
“consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will 
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.” 7 If it is to be more 
than a superficial box-checking exercise, consideration of a rulemaking’s 
effect on efficiency, competition, and capital formation requires an analysis 
of the rule’s benefits and costs. As Professors Paul Rose and Christopher 
Walker explained, “a failure to provide a reasoned explanation of the 
agency’s consideration of efficiency—in other words, its analysis of the 
costs and benefits of the proposed regulatory action—would be arbitrary 
and capricious under the [Administrative Procedure Act].”8 Section 
23(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) also 
requires rulemakings under that act to include a “determination that any 
burden on competition imposed by such rule or regulation is necessary or 
appropriate.”9 In addition, a number of discrete statutory provisions require 
the SEC to consider economic effects of rules adopted pursuant to those 
provisions.10 In fulfillment of these statutory obligations, the SEC typically 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 3, § 2(b) (directing OIRA to review executive 
agency rulemakings). 
 6. The former head of OIRA “encouraged” independent agencies “to give consideration to” 
President Obama’s Executive Order 13,563. See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, 
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, on Executive Order 13,563 (Feb. 2, 
2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2011/m11-
10.pdf. 
 7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b, 78c(f), 80a-2(c) (2012). This requirement was added to these statutes by 
the National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416. 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, added the language 
to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2. 
 8. PAUL ROSE & CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER, THE IMPORTANCE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 27 (2013), available at http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/04/CBA-Report-3.10.13.pdf; but see Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F. 
Supp. 2d 43, 56 (D.D.C. 2013) (explaining that a mandatory analysis by the SEC of “various 
economic-related factors—efficiency, competition, and capital formation” or “some sort of 
broader, wide-ranging benefit analysis simply reads too much into this statutory language”). 
 9. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(2). 
 10. See, e.g., id. § 78f(k)(1) (“To the extent necessary or appropriate in the public interest, to 
promote fair competition, and consistent with the promotion of market efficiency, innovation, and 
expansion of investment opportunities, the protection of investors, and the maintenance of fair and 
orderly markets, the Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission shall jointly 
issue such rules, regulations, or orders as are necessary and appropriate to permit the offer and 
sale of a security futures product traded on or subject to the rules of a foreign board of trade to 
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includes an analysis section—the so-called “back-end”—in its notices of 
proposed and final rulemaking. 
The quality and extent of the analysis have been called into question by 
academics, oversight bodies, and courts. Fraas and Lutter, in their 
examination of three major SEC rules, identified a number of flaws in the 
SEC’s approach to economic analysis.11 Aside from Paperwork Reduction 
Act estimates, discussions of costs and benefits were largely qualitative.12 
The SEC did not attempt to quantify costs such as “increased transaction 
costs or a reduction in market efficiency.”13 A rule related to short selling 
included some analysis of data about the effect of short sale restrictions, but 
lacked “a framework of analysis that would pull together the various pieces 
of evidence and analysis into a more complete whole.”14 
The SEC’s inspector general undertook an assessment of the SEC’s 
cost-benefit analysis practices in connection with certain Dodd-Frank 
rulemakings and identified a number of issues with the SEC’s approach.15 
There was no attempt to quantify benefits or costs other than information 
collection costs.16 The focus was on discretionary elements of the 
rulemaking and ignored the analysis of the elements of the rulemaking that 
were statutorily mandated.17 “[T]he SEC sometimes used multiple baselines 
in its cost-benefit analyses that were ambiguous or internally 
inconsistent.”18 In some cases, the SEC did not clearly justify the regulatory 
action being undertaken.19 For most rules, the SEC failed to take into 
account the SEC’s administrative costs.20 There was redundancy between 
the cost-benefit analysis and efficiency, competition, and capital formation 
sections of the releases.21 The inspector general made six corresponding 
                                                                                                                 
United States persons.”); id. § 78o(n)(2) (“In developing any rules under [the prior paragraph 
relating to disclosures by broker-dealers to retail investors], the Commission shall consider 
whether the rules will promote investor protection, efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation.”). 
 11. See generally Arthur Fraas & Randall Lutter, On the Economic Analysis of Regulations at 
Independent Regulatory Commissions, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 213 (2011). 
 12. Id. at 232–33.  
 13. Id. at 233.  
 14. Id. at 234. 
 15. SEC OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., NO. 499, FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSES IN SELECTED SEC DODD-FRANK ACT RULEMAKINGS vi–vii (2012) [hereinafter SEC 
2012 IG REPORT], available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/reports/audits/2012/rpt499 
_followupreviewofd-f_costbenefitanalyses_508.pdf. This report was a follow-up to an earlier, less 
in-depth report on the same subject. See SEC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT OF REVIEW OF 
ECONOMIC ANALYSES PERFORMED BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION IN 
CONNECTION WITH DODD-FRANK ACT RULEMAKINGS (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov 
/about/offices/oig/reports/audits/2011/report_6_13_11.pdf. 
 16. SEC 2012 IG REPORT, supra note 15, at vi. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. at vii.  
 20. See id.  
 21. Id. at vi.  
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recommendations and urged the SEC to deepen economists’ involvement in 
the process.22 
The Government Accountability Office also reported on rulemaking by 
the federal financial regulators, including the SEC, and concluded the 
following: 
While the regulators identified the problem to be addressed in their rule 
proposals, CFTC, the Federal Reserve, and SEC did not present benefit-
cost information in ways consistent with certain key elements of OMB’s 
Circular A-4 [which guides executive agencies in their performance of 
RIAs]. For example, CFTC and SEC did not evaluate the benefits and 
costs of regulatory alternatives they considered for key provisions 
compared to their chosen approach . . . .  
SEC did not quantitatively analyze the benefits . . . . CFTC and SEC 
monetized and quantified paperwork-related costs under PRA, but did not 
quantify any other costs.23 
Courts have also weighed in. Over the past seven years, the SEC has 
lost several important court cases based on how it has carried out its 
analysis obligations.24 The first of these cases, Chamber of Commerce v. 
SEC, arose from a rulemaking that would have effectively required mutual 
funds to have a super-majority of independent directors and an independent 
chairman.25 The court held that the SEC had “violate[d] the APA by failing 
adequately to consider the costs mutual funds would incur . . . and by 
failing adequately to consider a proposed alternative to the independent 
chairman condition.”26 The court expressly refused to hold that the SEC 
was required to conduct an empirical study of its own, or that it could not 
reject a study submitted to it based on legitimate concerns about the study, 
but faulted the SEC for not doing what it could to understand the costs of 
the rule.27 The court explained that  
uncertainty may limit what the Commission can do, but it does not excuse 
the Commission from its statutory obligation to do what it can to apprise 
itself—and hence the public and the Congress—of the economic 
consequences of a proposed regulation before it decides whether to adopt 
the measure.28 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Id. at vii–viii. 
 23. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 16, 18. It should be noted that the 
GAO reviewed only one major SEC rule in depth. Id. at 4.  
 24. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Am. Equity Inv. 
Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 572 F.3d 923, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 
F.3d 890, 909 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 145 (D.C. Cir. 
2005). 
 25. Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 137. 
 26. Id. at 136.  
 27. Id. at 142–44.  
 28. Id. at 144.  
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 The court also held that the SEC was required to consider a reasonable 
alternative raised by the dissenting commissioners and commenters.29 
On remand, the SEC upheld the rule after about a week of deliberation 
without reopening the comment period.30 The SEC responded to the court’s 
determination that it had not adequately assessed the costs of its rulemaking 
by undertaking a new assessment using “the existing record, together with 
publicly available information.”31 The SEC’s action was again challenged, 
and the court found that the SEC’s reliance on extra-record data was 
inappropriate because the public had not had a chance to comment on it.32 
One component of a good RIA is notifying the public of the data upon 
which the agency relies so that members of the public can respond.33 
Moreover, the court found that, despite admitted gaps in cost data, the SEC 
had not considered actual cost data from funds that were already complying 
with the new requirements in anticipation of the rulemaking compliance 
date.34 
The SEC’s approach to assessing the effects on competition, efficiency, 
and capital formation was central to the court’s holding in American Equity 
Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC.35 The rule at issue in American 
Equity deemed fixed index annuities to be governed by the securities laws 
rather than solely by state insurance laws—which meant that the SEC 
would regulate these annuities.36 The court held that the SEC’s analysis of 
each of the three elements under section 2(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 
(the Securities Act)37—competition, efficiency, and capital formation—was 
arbitrary and capricious.38 The SEC had concluded that the rule would 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Id. at 145 (“[T]he disclosure alternative was neither frivolous nor out of bounds and the 
Commission therefore had an obligation to consider it.”) (citing the standard set forth in Laclede 
Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 873 F.2d 1494, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).  
 30. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,985, 70 Fed. 
Reg. 39,390, 39,390 (July 7, 2005). 
 31. Id. at 39,391.  
 32. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 906 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 33. See, e.g., Circular A-4 from Office of Mgmt. and Budget to the Heads of Exec. Agencies 
& Establishments 17 (Sept. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Circular A-4], available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/regulatory_matters_pdf/a-4.pdf (setting 
forth guidelines for transparency and reproducibility of RIAs and their underlying assumptions, 
methods, and data). 
 34. Chamber of Commerce, 443 F.3d at 906. 
 35. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 572 F.3d 923 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 36. Id. at 928 (“By redefining an ‘annuity contract’ to exclude [fixed index annuities], the 
Commission sought to ensure that purchasers of FIAs would be entitled to the full protection of 
the federal securities laws.”); see also Baird Webel & Rena S. Miller, Securities and Exchange 
Commission Rule 151A and Annuities: Issues and Legislation 5 (Cong. Res. Serv. July 1, 2010), 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA530625 (“The primary impact of 
this rule change is that many, if not most, of the practices related to the sale of indexed annuities 
of those companies and individuals selling indexed annuities will be regulated by both the SEC 
and the states.”). 
 37. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2012). 
 38. See Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 572 F.3d at 934. 
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increase competition, but the basis it cited in reaching that conclusion was 
that the rulemaking would decrease uncertainty, a rationale that, the court 
pointed out, could have applied to any rulemaking, not just the particular 
rule at issue.39 The court also cited the SEC’s failure to assess the existing 
level of competition under the state regulatory framework.40 The SEC’s 
efficiency analysis failed “to analyze the efficiency of the existing state law 
regime.”41 The capital formation analysis relied on the efficiency analysis, 
so it too was arbitrary and capricious.42 
Business Roundtable v. SEC was a challenge to the SEC’s first 
rulemaking under Dodd-Frank.43 The rule at issue would have required 
public companies to include at company expense in their proxy materials 
information about shareholder-nominated candidates for company boards of 
directors. The court held that “the Commission was arbitrary and capricious 
in promulgating” the rule and vacated it.44 The court’s holding was based 
on the SEC’s “failure to ‘apprise itself—and hence the public and the 
Congress—of the economic consequences of’” the rule as required by the 
SEC’s organic statute.45 
In determining that the SEC’s assessment of the economic effects of the 
rule was flawed, the court pointed to a number of problems. First, the SEC 
did not attempt to estimate the costs that companies would incur as a result 
of the rule, even though there was available evidence concerning costs.46 
Second, the SEC did not have sufficient empirical support for its prediction 
that the rule would enhance board performance and shareholder value.47 
Third, the SEC discounted the rule’s costs by attributing them to the state 
law granting shareholders the right to elect directors, not the rule’s 
requirement that companies pay for shareholder nominees to be included in 
the company’s proxy materials.48 Fourth, the rule did not take adequate 
                                                                                                                 
 39. See id. at 934–35.  
 40. Id. at 935.  
 41. Id. at 936.  
 42. See id.  
 43. The rule at issue was proposed prior to Dodd-Frank’s becoming law, even though the SEC 
arguably did not have the authority to adopt the rule before Dodd-Frank was finalized. See, e.g., 
Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r, SEC, Statement at Open Meeting to Propose Amendments 
Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (May 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch052009klc.htm (“[T]he Commission’s authority to 
enact these rules is subject to significant doubt. The Supreme Court has made clear that, in the 
absence of an explicit federal law, state law governs the internal affairs of the corporation, and the 
D.C. Circuit has held that proxy rules that are substantive, rather than procedural or related to 
disclosure, are not valid. As I have discussed, the rules that the Commission proposes today 
regulate matters at the heart of corporate law, and thus our authority to adopt them is 
questionable.”). 
 44. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 1150.  
 47. Id. at 1151.  
 48. Id.  
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account of the possibility that the rule would be used to further the special 
interests of particular shareholders at the expense of the company.49 Fifth, 
the SEC failed to properly assess net benefits because it did not consider the 
degree to which it would simply displace traditional election contests 
(rather than encourage new ones).50 Sixth, the SEC used different estimates 
about how often the rule would be used in calculating the costs and the 
benefits of the rule.51 Seventh, the SEC did not adequately consider the 
degree to which the costs and benefits for investment companies would be 
different from the costs and benefits experienced by other companies.52 
The Business Roundtable case focused attention on the SEC’s use of 
economic analysis. Some argue that the court went too far and imposed 
extra-statutory requirements.53 The SEC, however, faced with Business 
Roundtable and its other court losses and juggling a heavy rulemaking load 
under Dodd-Frank that could lead to future legal challenges,54 did not 
appeal the decision. Instead, it took important steps to improve the quality 
of its analysis. In March 2012 (approximately eight months after the 
Business Roundtable decision), the SEC’s general counsel and chief 
economist issued a joint memorandum to the staff that provides guidance 
about how to conduct economic analysis.55 The guidance explains that 
“[h]igh-quality economic analysis . . . ensures that decisions to propose and 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. at 1151–52.  
 50. Id. at 1153.  
 51. Id. at 1154.  
 52. Id. at 1154–56.  
 53. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward a Framework of 
Function(s) and Form(s), 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1983, 2064 (2013) (arguing that the Business 
Roundtable decision imposed requirements on the SEC that are not in the statute); James D. Cox 
& Benjamin J. C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s 
Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1828 (2012) (arguing that the 
D.C. Circuit’s calls for cost-benefit analysis go beyond what the statute demands); Jill E. Fisch, 
The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable and the Future of SEC Rulemaking, 36 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 695, 712 (2013) (footnotes omitted) (“The D.C. Circuit appears to have extended hard look 
analysis in Business Roundtable and its predecessor cases by adding a specific requirement 
concerning cost-benefit analysis. In Business Roundtable, the court stated that the SEC is required 
to ‘apprise itself—and hence the public and the Congress—of the economic consequences of a 
proposed regulation.’ The source of this additional obligation is unclear.”); Anthony W. Mongone, 
Note, Business Roundtable: A New Level of Judicial Scrutiny and Its Implications in a Post-Dodd-
Frank World, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 746, 793 (arguing that, in the face of “extensive 
evidence” in support of the SEC’s position, the court should have been more deferential in its 
review of the SEC’s decision). 
 54. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). According to one count, the SEC has ninety-five rulemaking 
mandates under Dodd-Frank. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, DODD-FRANK PROGRESS REPORT 
5 (2012), available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/7fcba133-a0f9-4f21-99bf-
058fb1549967/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/49342d7b-2f7f-45ea-b328-0639e232fa85 
/Oct2012_Dodd.Frank.Progress.Report.pdf. 
 55. Memorandum from the SEC Div. of Risk, Strategy, and Fin. Innovation and the Office of 
Gen. Counsel to the Staff of the Rulewriting Divs. and Offices (Mar. 16, 2012) [hereinafter SEC 
Guidance], available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi_guidance_econ_analy 
_secrulemaking.pdf. 
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adopt rules are informed by the best available information about a rule’s 
likely economic consequences, and allows the Commission to meaningfully 
compare the proposed action with reasonable alternatives, including the 
alternative of not adopting a rule.”56 
The guidance sets forth a fairly robust set of principles for economic 
analysis. It is based on the executive orders and the accompanying OIRA 
guidance governing economic analysis at executive agencies.57 The 
guidance describes the key components that should be included in the 
economic analysis accompanying every SEC rulemaking, namely a 
statement of need, identification of a baseline against which to measure the 
effects of the regulation, identification of reasonable alternatives, and an 
evaluation of the costs and benefits of the proposed regulation and the 
alternatives.58 
The first two components of the SEC’s guidance mirror the very first 
principle enunciated in Executive Order 12,866: “Each agency shall identify 
the problem that it intends to address (including, where applicable, the 
failures of private markets or public institutions that warrant new action) as 
well as assess the significance of that problem.”59 Circular A-4, OMB’s 
guidance to agencies on regulatory analysis, offers more specific 
instructions: 
If the regulation is designed to correct a significant market failure, you 
should describe the failure both qualitatively and (where feasible) 
quantitatively . . . . For other interventions, you should also provide a 
demonstration of compelling social purpose and the likelihood of effective 
action. Although intangible rationales do not need to be quantified, the 
analysis should present and evaluate the strengths and limitations of the 
relevant arguments for these intangible values.60 
Analysis of the need for the regulation and the baseline are crucial first 
steps in regulatory impact analysis. If an agency does not understand the 
systemic problem the regulation seeks to solve or how markets are likely to 
evolve in the absence of a new regulation, it cannot know whether a new 
regulation is actually necessary. If an agency does not understand the root 
cause of the systemic problem, it cannot reliably devise an effective 
solution, and it may not even recognize the most effective alternative. And 
if the agency does not know what problem it is trying to solve or whether 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Id. at 1.  
 57. See Exec. Order No. 13,563, supra note 4; Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 3; Circular 
A-4, supra note 33. 
 58. SEC Guidance, supra note 55, at 4–15. 
 59. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 3, § 1(b)(1). “Market failure” and “government 
failure” are both pieces of economic terminology that have specific meanings; they indicate 
situations when markets or the government fails to produce economically efficient results, for 
several well-defined reasons. For a highly readable and brief description, see SUSAN E. DUDLEY & 
JERRY BRITO, REGULATION: A PRIMER 12–20 (2d ed. 2012). 
 60. Circular A-4, supra note 33, at 4. 
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that problem is likely to continue in the future, it cannot reliably estimate 
the benefits of a proposed regulation or alternatives. For these reasons, a 
thorough analysis of the systemic problem and the baseline are necessary to 
determine not just whether a regulation is needed, but also to design an 
effective regulation when the agency determines that a regulation is needed, 
or when Congress has already directed the agency to issue a regulation. 
It is not clear if the SEC has fully committed itself to an analysis of the 
systemic problem that is as extensive as OMB has suggested. On the one 
hand, the guidance’s section on justification for rulemakings includes a 
discussion of market failure, and the section on baselines notes that “where 
a statute directs rulemaking, rulewriting staff should consider the overall 
economic impacts, including both those attributable to Congressional 
mandates and those that result from an exercise of the Commission’s 
discretion.”61 On the other hand, the guidance also mentions that a statutory 
requirement for regulation counts as an independent justification for the 
regulation,62 and chief economist Craig Lewis has said the justification for a 
regulation can be as basic as “Congress told us to.”63 Citing a statute, 
however, is not the same thing as analyzing a problem. Without identifying 
a problem, it will be difficult for the SEC to assess whether a new 
regulation is necessary or analyze how effectively different regulatory 
approaches will solve the problem. 
The guidance also sets out an integrated role in the rulemaking process 
for economists—who SEC lawyers typically had brought in only at the end 
of the rulemaking process.64 The SEC’s chief economist explained that the 
guidance “lays out a general approach to rulewriting to ensure that 
economists are involved at each step of the rule development process, from 
the policy development stage—before a release is even drafted—up through 
final adoption” and “provid[es] general principles to guide staff . . . as to the 
substantive elements of a robust economic analysis.”65 
In addition to the new guidance regarding economic analysis, the SEC 
reversed an earlier structural change that had severed the chief economist’s 
                                                                                                                 
 61. See SEC Guidance, supra note 55, at 8. 
 62. Id. at 6.  
 63. See Craig M. Lewis, Chief Economist & Dir., Div. of Risk, Strategy & Fin. Innovation, 
SEC, Remarks before the SIFMA Compliance & Legal Society Luncheon: The Expanded Role of 
Economists in SEC Rulemaking (Oct. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Lewis Remarks], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch101612cml.htm (“We must define our goals so that we 
can then thoughtfully examine the various avenues that are available to us. This can be more 
difficult than it sounds. Sometimes it can be clear, as with a specific market failure that cannot be 
solved without regulatory intervention. Other times—as we see with the Dodd-Frank Act and the 
JOBS Act—Congress has identified a problem for us and directed us to engage in rulemaking to 
address it. In that case, the justification for why regulation is necessary can be something as basic 
as, ‘Congress told us to.’”). 
 64. SEC Guidance, supra note 55, at 15–17. 
 65. Lewis Remarks, supra note 63. 
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direct reporting line to the SEC chairman.66 The direct reporting line was 
restored by merging the positions of division director and chief economist, 
which once again ensured that the chief economist would have direct 
responsibility and accountability to the chairman for economic analysis at 
the SEC.67  
In May 2011, Craig Lewis took over as chief economist and director of 
the SEC’s Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation,68 which 
was subsequently renamed the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis.69 
In that capacity, the chief economist has a division reporting to him and 
reports directly to the chairman, which presumably gives him greater ability 
to influence rulemaking and makes the position a more powerful one at the 
SEC.70 
II. RULES SELECTED FOR THIS STUDY 
As the SEC implements its new approach to economic analysis, it will 
be helpful to have a baseline that indicates the quality of the SEC’s analysis 
in the recent past. This Article, through a detailed look at seven SEC 
rulemakings finalized before the SEC’s staff issued its new memorandum 
guidance in March 2012,71 identifies some areas in which the SEC’s 
analysis is deficient and could be improved. We looked at final rulemakings 
so that we could assess the SEC’s analysis at a stage when it had the benefit 
of being informed by commenters. To see whether the SEC’s economic 
analysis has improved since March 2012, in a subsequent section we also 
assess one rule finalized in November 2012.72 
                                                                                                                 
 66. See, e.g., Jesse Westbrook, SEC Economist Vacancies May Aid Legal Challenges of Dodd-
Frank, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 24, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-
24/sec-economist-vacancies-may-aid-legal-challenges-of-dodd-frank.html (reporting SEC 
Chairman Mary Schapiro’s decision to end direct reporting of chief economist to her and 
implications of her decision). 
 67. Hester Peirce, Economic Analysis by Federal Financial Regulators, 9 GEO. MASON J.L. 
ECON. & POL’Y 569, 585 (2013). 
 68. Press Release, SEC, Vanderbilt Professor Craig Lewis Named SEC Chief Economist and 
Director of RiskFin Division (May 20, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011 
/2011-114.htm. 
 69. Press Release, SEC, SEC Renames Division Focusing on Economic and Risk Analysis 
(June 6, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease 
/1365171575272#.UgFl8Kxkj_Y. 
 70. See Peirce, supra note 67, at 585 (arguing that structural changes “should help give the 
SEC’s economists a stronger voice in the agency’s rulemaking and other matters”). 
 71. Although the July 2011 Business Roundtable decision was a meaningful warning that the 
SEC’s economic analysis program needed improvement, the issuance of the guidance was a more 
important landmark, as it laid out a uniform approach to economic analysis. For this reason, we 
believe that changes in the quality of the SEC’s economic analysis are more likely to be 
observable after its issuance, as opposed to immediately after the Business Roundtable decision. 
We report infra that there appears to be no significant difference in the quality of SEC regulatory 
analysis prior to and after July 2011. 
 72. Clearing Agency Standards, Exchange Act Release No. 68,080, 77 Fed. Reg. 66,220 (Nov. 
2, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) [hereinafter Clearing Agency Standards Release]. 
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The seven pre-guidance rules were selected in a manner intended to 
provide a meaningful look at the quality of rules across the SEC’s different 
divisions. Using the Government Accountability Office’s Federal Rules 
Database, major rules adopted by the SEC were selected.73 All of the rules 
are final rules adopted after a notice of proposed rulemaking and a comment 
period. We began the study in February 2012. We selected the two most 
recent major rules (by Federal Register publication date) from each of the 
SEC’s major rulemaking divisions—the Division of Corporation Finance,74 
the Division of Investment Management,75 and the Division of Trading and 
Markets.76 One rule (again, the most recent major rule) was selected from 
the Division of Enforcement, which does not typically write rules, but was 
charged with carrying out a significant Dodd-Frank rulemaking related to 
whistleblowing.77 
The purpose of selecting rules from each division was to ensure that we 
capture a broad view of rulemaking issues within the SEC’s regulatory 
jurisdiction. Each rule is unique, and a complete analysis would require an 
assessment of every SEC rulemaking, but selecting major rules from each 
division offers a useful cross-section of significant SEC rulemaking. Each 
division has its own regulatory agenda that corresponds to the portion of the 
                                                                                                                 
 73. GAO Federal Rules Database Search, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 
http://www.gao.gov/legal/congressact/fedrule.html (within “Agency,” select “Independent 
Agencies and Govt Corporations; within “Subagency,” select “United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission”; within “Rule Type,” select “Major”; for “Date Published in Federal 
Register,” leave start date unchanged and set “To” date at “02/01/2012” click on “Search”; from 
list, select first two rules for each rulemaking division, with the exception of the Division of 
Enforcement, for which there is only one rule and the Division of Investment Management, for 
which one of the two most recent rules is listed under “Subagency” “Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission”; to determine responsible Division, view final rule at 
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/ and search within “For further information contact:” to 
identify Division of first listed contact person).  
 74. Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, Securities Act Release No. 9287, Investment 
Advisors Act Release No. 3341, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,793-02 (Dec. 29, 2011) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270, 275) [hereinafter Net Worth Standard Release]; Shareholder Approval 
of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, Securities Act Release No. 
9178, Exchange Act Release No. 63,768, 76 Fed. Reg. 6010 (Feb. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 229, 240 and 249) [hereinafter Shareholder Approval Release]. 
 75. Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool 
Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 
3308, 76 Fed. Reg. 71,128-01 (Nov. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Reporting by Investment Advisors 
Release]; Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment 
Advisors Act Release No. 3221, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,950 (July 19, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 275, 279) [hereinafter Rules Implementing Amendments Release]. 
 76. Large Trader Reporting, Exchange Act Release No. 64,976, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,960 (Aug. 3, 
2011) (to be codified 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249) [hereinafter Large Trader Reporting]; Risk 
Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with Market Access, Exchange Act Release No. 
63,241, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,792 (Nov. 15, 2010) (to be codified 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) [hereinafter Risk 
Management Controls Release]. 
 77. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, Exchange Act Release No. 64,545, 
76 Fed. Reg. 34,300 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) [hereinafter 
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Release]. 
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SEC’s jurisdiction for which it is responsible.78 The Office of General 
Counsel and Division of Economic and Risk Analysis assist the divisional 
rulewriting teams.79 In addition, selecting rules from each division helps to 
capture the differences in approach employed by different division directors 
and staff. One of the rules happened to be a joint rule with the CFTC.80 All 
of the rules predate the new guidance on economic analysis. All of these 
rules were finalized during a very busy period of SEC rulemaking in 
fulfillment of the SEC’s mandates under Dodd-Frank.81 The rules are 
summarized in Table 1 below. 
TABLE 1. RULES ANALYZED. 




Controls for Brokers 
or Dealers with 
Market Access 
 
Division of Trading 
and Markets  
 
Nov. 15, 2010 
 
New Rule 15c-3 under the Exchange Act requires 
brokers or dealers offering direct access to an 
exchange or alternative trading system (ATS): 
• to establish, document, and maintain a 
system of risk management controls and 
supervisory procedures to limit the financial, 
legal, and operational risks of the broker or dealer 
and ensure compliance with regulatory 
requirements; and 
• to craft controls reasonably designed to 
prevent the entry of orders that are erroneous, 
exceed certain credit and capital thresholds, or 
violate regulatory requirements. 
                                                                                                                 
 78. See SEC, FISCAL YEAR 2013 FINANCIAL REPORT 11 tbl.1.1 (2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secafr2013.pdf (describing responsibilities of each SEC 
division). 
 79. See id. (describing responsibilities of the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis and 
Office of General Counsel). 
 80. Reporting by Investment Advisors Release, supra note 75. 
 81. See Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—
Accomplishments, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/accomplishments.shtml (last 
modified Apr. 18, 2014) (listing rules SEC has proposed or adopted under Dodd-Frank and 
relevant Dodd-Frank sections). 







Division of Trading 
and Markets 
 
Aug. 3, 2011 
 
New Rule 13h-1: 
• requires large traders to self-identify to 
the SEC in order to receive an identification 
number; 
• requires large traders to provide this 
identification number to broker-dealers that effect 
transactions on their behalf; 
• requires broker-dealers to use the large 
trader identification number to maintain records 
and report transactions to the SEC; and 
• requires monitoring by broker-dealers of 











June 13, 2011 
 
These new rules and forms under section 21F of 
the Exchange Act (section 922 of Dodd-Frank) 
establish a new whistleblower program at the 
SEC. The new rules establish procedures 
governing: 
• the reporting of potential securities law 
violations to the SEC; and 
• the determination and payment of an 
award of ten to thirty percent of the total amount 
collected by the SEC if the tip leads to a 
successful enforcement action by the SEC that 
generates more than $1 million in monetary 
sanctions. 






Amendments to the 
Investment Advisers 






July 19, 2011 
These amendments to the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940 (Advisers Act) and to Form ADV 
largely implement provisions of Dodd-Frank. 
Specifically, the new rules: 
• provide for the transition of medium-sized 
advisers to state registration from SEC 
registration; 
• require advisers to hedge funds and 
certain other private funds to register with the 
SEC and provide certain information to the SEC 
on Form ADV; 
• implement Dodd-Frank registration 
exemptions for certain foreign advisers and 
advisers to venture capital funds and small private 
funds; 
• require these “exempt reporting advisers” 
to file certain reports with the SEC; and 




to Private Funds and 
Certain Commodity 
Pool Operators and 
Commodity Trading 







Nov. 16, 2011 
 
This joint SEC-CFTC rulemaking implements 
provisions of Title IV of Dodd-Frank. 
Specifically, the new rules: 
• require investment advisers to one or 
more large private funds to file Form PF with the 
SEC; and 
• require certain commodity pool operators 
and commodity trading advisors to file Form PF 
with the SEC and allow these entities to satisfy 
future CFTC filing requirements with respect to 
commodity pools that are not private funds with 
the Form PF filing. 














Feb. 2, 2011 
 
This rulemaking, which implements section 
951 of Dodd-Frank: 
• requires companies to conduct a separate 
shareholder advisory vote to approve executive 
compensation; 
• requires companies to conduct a vote to 
determine how often they will conduct a 
shareholder advisory vote on executive 
compensation; 
• requires companies that are conducting a 
shareholder vote on merger and acquisition 
transactions to disclose golden parachute 
compensation agreements and, in certain cases, to 
conduct a shareholder advisory vote on those 
arrangements; and 
• affords smaller companies an extended 
transition period to come into compliance with the 
new requirements. 







Dec. 29, 2011 
This rulemaking, which implements section 
413(a) of Dodd-Frank: 
• revises the definition of “accredited 
investor” to exclude the value of a person’s 
primary residence and certain associated debt 
when calculating the person’s net worth; and 





Division of Trading 
and Markets 
 
Nov. 2, 2012 
 
This rulemaking, as required by Dodd-Frank, 
establishes minimum risk management and 
operational standards for registered clearing 
agencies, particularly those that act as central 
counterparties.  
III. EVALUATION OF RULES USING THE MERCATUS 
CENTER’S REGULATORY REPORT CARD 
One way to assess the quality of SEC regulatory analysis is to use a 
standardized scoring system that has already been applied to evaluate the 
quality and use of regulatory analysis by other federal agencies. The 
Mercatus Center’s Regulatory Report Card has qualitatively assessed the 
quality and use of regulatory analysis for proposed, economically 
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significant regulations issued by executive branch agencies since 2008.82 
Two years of these evaluations (2010 and 2011) are thus roughly 
contemporaneous with the period when the seven SEC regulations 
described above were developed, proposed, and finalized. The Report Card 
consists of twelve criteria grouped into three categories: Openness, 
Analysis, and Use. Table 2 lists the twelve criteria, which are derived from 
Executive Order 12,866 and OMB Circular A-4. 
TABLE 2. REGULATORY ANALYSIS ASSESSMENT CRITERIA. 
Openness 
1. Accessibility: How easily were the Regulatory Impact Analysis, the 
proposed rule, and any supplementary materials found online? 
2. Data Documentation: How verifiable are the data used in the analysis? 
3. Model Documentation: How verifiable are the models and assumptions 
used in the analysis? 
4. Clarity: Was the analysis comprehensible to an informed layperson? 
 
Analysis 
5. Outcomes: How well does the analysis identify the desired benefits or 
other outcomes and demonstrate that the regulation will achieve them? 
6. Systemic Problem: How well does the analysis identify and demonstrate 
the existence of a market failure or other systemic problem the regulation is 
supposed to solve? 
7. Alternatives: How well does the analysis assess the effectiveness of 
alternative approaches? 
8. Benefit-Cost Analysis: How well does the analysis assess costs and 
compare them with benefits? 
 
Use 
9. Some Use of Analysis: Does the preamble to the proposed rule or the 
Regulatory Impact Analysis present evidence that the agency used the 
analysis? 
10. Cognizance of Net Benefits: Did the agency maximize net benefits or 
explain why it chose another option? 
11. Measures and Goals: Does the proposed rule establish measures and 
goals that can be used to track the regulation’s results in the future? 
12. Retrospective Data: Did the agency indicate what data it will use to 
assess the regulation’s performance in the future and establish provisions 
for doing so? 
                                                                                                                 
 82. The Report Card methodology is explained in Jerry Ellig & Patrick A. McLaughlin, The 
Quality and Use of Regulatory Analysis in 2008, 32 RISK ANALYSIS 855, 858–62 (2012). An 
explanation of the scoring method and all score data for the Mercatus Regulatory Report Card are 
available at Regulatory Report Card, MERCATUS CENTER GEO. MASON U., http://mercatus.org 
/reportcards (last visited Apr. 11, 2014). 
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The Report Card methodology is a middle ground between “checklist” 
systems for scoring regulatory analysis83 and in-depth qualitative case 
studies.84 Expert reviewers trained in the evaluation method assign each 
regulatory analysis a Likert Scale (0–5) score. For each criterion, the 
evaluators assign a score ranging from 0 (no useful content) to 5 
(comprehensive analysis with potential best practices).85 Since there are 
twelve criteria, the maximum possible score is 60 points. The scores are 
ordinal, not cardinal, and so we caution the reader to interpret the numerical 
comparisons below the same way one would interpret student test scores. 
An analysis that earns twice as many points as another one is clearly better, 
but the numbers should not be interpreted too literally; the analysis with 
double the score is not necessarily twice as good. 
A 2012 article in the peer-reviewed journal Risk Analysis describes the 
Report Card’s methodology and first year’s results; we refer readers to that 
article for a more detailed description.86 Several articles using Report Card 
data have been published in scholarly journals.87 Statistical tests show that 
the method produced consistent results from scorers trained in the 
evaluation method.88 Report Card findings on the quality of agency 
                                                                                                                 
 83. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-97-38, AIR POLLUTION: INFORMATION 
CONTAINED IN EPA’S REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSES CAN BE MADE CLEARER (1997); U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-98-142, REGULATORY REFORM: AGENCIES COULD 
IMPROVE DEVELOPMENT, DOCUMENTATION, AND CLARITY OF REGULATORY ECONOMIC 
ANALYSES (1998); Art Fraas & Randall Lutter, The Challenges of Improving the Economic 
Analysis of Pending Regulations: The Experience of OMB Circular A-4, 3 ANN. REV. RES. ECON. 
71 (2011); Robert W. Hahn et al., Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failure of Agencies 
to Comply with Executive Order 12,866, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 859 (2000); Robert W. 
Hahn & Robert E. Litan, How Well Does the Government Do Cost-Benefit Analysis?, 1 REV. ENV. 
ECON. & POL’Y 192 (2007); Robert W. Hahn & Robert Litan, Counting Regulatory Benefits and 
Costs: Lessons for the U.S. and Europe, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 473 (2005); Stuart Shapiro & John F. 
Morrall, III, The Triumph of Regulatory Politics: Benefit-Cost Analysis and Political Salience, 6 
REG. & GOVERNANCE 189 (2012). 
 84. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT (Richard D. 
Morgenstern ed., 1997); THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREACRACY (1991); RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, 
REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (Winston Harrington et al. eds., 2009); Arthur 
Fraas, The Role of Economic Analysis in Shaping Environmental Policy, 54 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 113 (1991); Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 53 
DUKE L.J. 1067 (2003).  
 85. Ellig & McLaughlin, supra note 82, at 855–69 (providing an extensive explanation and 
justification of the evaluation method). 
 86. See id.  
 87. See, e.g., Jerry Ellig et al., Continuity, Change, and Priorities: The Quality and Use of 
Regulatory Analysis Across US Administrations, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 153 (2013); Patrick A. 
McLaughlin & Jerry Ellig, Does OIRA Review Improve the Quality of Regulatory Impact 
Analysis? Evidence from Final Year of the Bush II Administration, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 179 
(2011). 
 88. Ellig et al., supra note 87. An evaluation of inter-rater reliability is available at Regulatory 
Report Card, supra note 82. 
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regulatory analysis are generally consistent with the results of prior 
researchers’ quantitative and qualitative evaluations of RIAs.89   
Several trained Report Card scorers evaluated the SEC regulations that 
are the subject of this Article according to the method described above. 
These individuals have also evaluated executive branch regulations using 
the Report Card methodology.90 We can thus use the score data to assess 
the quality and use of the SEC’s economic analysis and compare it to the 
analysis produced by executive branch agencies.91 
Evaluators approached the project with no prior expectation about 
whether the SEC’s economic analysis was likely to be better or worse than 
that of executive branch agencies. On the one hand, judicial review of SEC 
analysis could motivate the SEC to produce better analysis than executive 
branch agencies. On the other hand, detailed guidance provided by 
Executive Order 12,866, OMB Circular A-4, and OIRA review could assist 
executive branch agencies in producing better analysis than the SEC. 
Table 3 and Figure 1 show the most basic results. The seven pre-2012 
SEC regulations scored very poorly, earning an average of 15.7 out of 60 
possible points (a score of just 26%). The highest-scoring regulation, 
Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, earned just 20 out of 60 possible 
points (33%). Interestingly, that rule came out of the SEC’s enforcement 
division, a part of the SEC that does not normally write rules. The 
regulations scored higher on Openness than on Analysis or Use—largely 
because the first Openness criterion assesses whether the regulations and 
analysis are easy to find online. The highest scores for the Analysis and Use 
categories were 5 points out of 20 possible points (25%). 
One anonymous reviewer of a previous version of this Article 
suggested that the SEC initiated changes to its economic analysis process 
after the July 2011 decision in the proxy access case. If any improvement 
occurred as a result of these changes, it is not obvious from the scores in 
Table 3. One regulation in our sample was finalized in November 2011, and 
another in December, but their average scores are approximately the same 
as the other regulations in the sample. Even if the SEC began initiating 
changes after July 2011, we suspect it is unlikely that significant effects of 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Ellig et al., supra note 87. 
 90. The evaluators were Sherzod Abdukadirov, a research fellow at the Mercatus Center; 
James Broughel, the manager of the Report Card project and a doctoral student in economics at 
George Mason University; Jerry Ellig, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center and one of 
the creators of the Report Card; and Todd Nesbit, assistant professor of economics at Ohio State 
University. 
 91. All of the executive branch regulations used for comparison in this Article were 
“prescriptive” regulations that contain mandates or prohibitions. We omitted budget regulations, 
which implement federal spending or revenue collection programs. Since the SEC regulations are 
prescriptive regulations, not budget regulations, this is the appropriate comparison. The 
“prescriptive” term originates from Posner, supra note 84, at 1073. 
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those changes would show up in final rules issued just a few months later, 
given that those rules were initially proposed in January 2011. 
TABLE 3. SEC REGULATIONS’ REPORT CARD SCORES 
 Date Total Openness Analysis Use 
Whistleblower Incentives 
and Protections 
6/13/11 20 11 4 5 
Reporting by Investment 
Advisers 
11/16/11 18 11 5 2 
Executive  
Compensation 
2/2/11 15 9 3 3 
Risk Management  
Controls 
11/15/10 15 9 4 2 
Amendments to the 
Investment Advisers Act 
7/19/11 14 9 4 1 
Large Trader  
Reporting 
8/3/11 14 9 3 2 
Net Worth Standard for 
Accredited Investors 
12/24/11 14 8 4 2 
FIGURE 1. OPENNESS, ANALYSIS, AND USE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN 








































Category of Criteria 
Executive Compensation
Reporting by Investemnt Advisors to Private Funds
and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and
Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF
Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act
Large Trader Reporting
Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors
Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers
with Market Access
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections
Rule Name 
 































Figure 2 compares the scores for the SEC regulations with scores for 
executive branch regulations. Executive branch agencies often produce 
incomplete regulatory impact analysis, averaging just 29.7 out of a 
maximum possible 60 points for 2010–11. Nevertheless, this is almost 
double the average score for the seven SEC regulations.92 














Figure 3 shows how the SEC regulations compare with executive 
branch regulations on the three major categories of criteria in the Report 
Card: openness, analysis, and use. The SEC regulations’ scores for quality 
of analysis and use of analysis to inform decisions fall far short of both the 
maximum possible score and the average scores earned by executive branch 
agencies.93 For both analysis and use of analysis, the executive agencies’ 











                                                                                                                 
 92. The differences in means are statistically significant at much greater than the one-percent 
level. 
 93. The differences in means are statistically significant at much greater than the one-percent 
level. 





























2010–11 Executive Branch  2010–11 SEC 
FIGURE 3. OPENNESS, ANALYSIS, AND USE COMPARISON 
The low scores for the SEC regulations might arguably be attributed to 
the fact that economic analysis of proposed financial regulations involves 
unique difficulties. Former SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro took the 
following position: 
Analyzing the predicted economic effects of proposed rules, while critical 
to the rulemaking process, can be challenging. As the GAO noted in its 
recent review of Dodd-Frank cost-benefit analyses, “the difficulty of 
reliably estimating the costs of regulations to the financial services 
industry and the nation has long been recognized, and the benefits of 
regulation generally are regarded as even more difficult to measure.”94 
Figure 4 sheds some light on this argument by comparing the SEC 
regulations’ average scores with the average scores executive branch 
agencies earned for their analysis of financial regulations. Several executive 
branch agencies issue regulations that address financial topics, such as the 
Department of Labor (pension and retirement savings plans), the 
Department of the Treasury (banking), and the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (mortgage finance).95 The Regulatory Report Card 
evaluated three executive branch financial regulations in 2010–11 and eight 
in 2008–11. We include scores from both time periods in Figure 4 to 
                                                                                                                 
 94. The SEC’s Aversion to Cost-Benefit Analysis: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on TARP, 
Fin. Servs. And Bailouts of Pub. and Private Programs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t 
Reform, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC), (quoting U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-12-151, DODD-FRANK ACT REGULATIONS: 
IMPLEMENTATION COULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND COORDINATION 19 
(2011)); see also CURTIS W. COPELAND, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND INDEPENDENT REGULATORY 
AGENCIES 97 (2013), available at http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Copeland 
%20Final%20BCA%20Report%204-30-13.pdf (cataloguing the SEC’s stated reasons for finding 
it “difficult to quantify certain regulatory costs and/or benefits,” including the difficulties of 
understanding the effects when the SEC is regulating a new area and estimating the benefit of one 
rule that is part of an interrelated set of rules). 
 95. See Ellig & McLaughlin, supra note 82, at 864 tbl.IV (listing such regulations).  





























2008–11 Executive Branch Financial 
2010–11 Executive Branch Financial  
2010–11 SEC 
provide a larger sample of Report Card regulations for comparison. Even 
when compared to the analysis of other agencies’ financial regulations, the 
SEC regulations score poorly.96 In fact, executive branch agencies’ average 
scores for financial regulations are about the same as the average scores for 
all executive branch regulations.97 Thus, it is doubtful that the low scores 
for the SEC regulations reflect some unique difficulties associated with 
analyzing financial regulations. 
FIGURE 4. EXECUTIVE BRANCH FINANCIAL REGULATIONS OUTSCORE 
SEC REGULATIONS 
The SEC economic analysis memorandum lists four major substantive 
requirements for analysis of rulemakings, reproduced in Table 4. Each of 
these requirements corresponds to one or more Report Card criteria, or to 
one or more sub-questions within a criterion. Therefore, we can compare 
the scores on these criteria to see how the SEC is doing on the specific 





                                                                                                                 
 96. The difference in means is statistically significant at the one-percent level for openness and 
at much greater than the one-percent level for analysis and use. 
 97. See Regulatory Report Card, supra note 82. 
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TABLE 4. SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR REGULATORY ANALYSIS 
IN SEC MEMORANDUM 
SEC Economic Analysis  
Requirement 
Report Card Criterion or Question(s) 
1. Clearly identify the 
justification for the proposed 
rule. 
Criterion 6: How well does the 
analysis demonstrate the existence of a 
market failure or other systemic 
problem the regulation is supposed to 
solve? 
2. Define the baseline against 
which to measure the proposed 
rule’s economic impact. 
Criterion 7, question D: Does the 
analysis adequately assess the baseline 
– what the state of the world is likely to 
be in the absence of further federal 
action? 
3. Identify and discuss 
reasonable alternatives to the 
proposed rule. 
Criterion 7: How well does the 
analysis assess the effectiveness of 
alternative approaches? 
4. Analyze the economic 
consequences of the proposed 
rule and the principal 
regulatory alternatives. 
Criterion 5: How well does the 
analysis identify the desired outcomes 
and demonstrate that the regulation will 
achieve them? 
 
Criterion 8: How well does the 
analysis assess costs and compare them 
with benefits? 
 
 Figure 5 demonstrates that the SEC has ample room to improve its 
analysis for all of the topics listed in the memorandum. The SEC’s highest-
scoring topic is discussion of alternatives, where it earned just 1.3 out of a 
possible 5 points, compared to an average of 2.7 points earned by executive 
branch agencies. On several topics the SEC regulations received average 
scores less than 1 point. A score of 1 point means that the analysis made 
some assertions about the topic, but provided only cursory argument and 
little evidence to back up its claims. Even though the executive branch 
agencies often produced seriously incomplete analysis, they always 
outscored the SEC substantially on the topics the SEC has identified as 
critical to sound economic analysis of rulemakings.98 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 98. The differences in means are statistically significant at much greater than the one-percent 
level. 
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FIGURE 5. HOW SEC COMPARES WITH EXECUTIVE BRANCH ON ISSUES 
THE SEC IDENTIFIES AS IMPORTANT 
IV. OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE SEC’S 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
Although performing a comprehensive regulatory analysis for the rules 
is beyond the scope of this Article, in this Part we endeavor to point out 
some ways in which each analysis could have been improved. For each 
rule, we suggest ways in which the SEC could have more thoroughly 
evaluated the systemic problem it was trying to solve, the available 
alternatives, and the economic consequences—three critical components of 
the SEC’s staff guidance on economic analysis. The fourth component 
mentioned in the guidance—the baseline—is in some cases an important 
part of assessing the need for the regulation and in other cases an important 
component of assessing alternatives. Where baseline issues are significant, 
we consider them as part of our discussion of the systemic problem or 
alternatives. As this discussion demonstrates, the SEC could have drawn on 
its own expertise, literature, and economic theory in analyzing the rules. 
Instead, much of the SEC’s analysis appears to be grounded in the 
SEC’s beliefs, the basis for which is generally not provided. The phrase 
“we believe” appears an average of forty times in the Federal Register 
notices for the seven pre-2012 regulations. In contrast, the same phrase 
appears in the notices for the 2010–11 executive branch regulations an 
average of ten times—and not at all in the NPRMs and RIAs for twenty-one 
executive branch regulations!99 While this tabulation may to some extent 
                                                                                                                 
 99. In five of the seven SEC notices, the phrase “we believe” appears between thirty and 
ninety-three times. 
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reflect merely stylistic differences between agencies, combined with the 
SEC’s lower Report Card scores, it suggests that the SEC has been more 
willing than executive branch agencies to base decisions on beliefs or 
assertions rather than evidence. 
Perhaps because the analysis is relatively thin, we find few examples 
where the SEC claimed that the economic analysis affected its decisions. 
Below, we describe opportunities for improvement that would have been 
quite feasible for the SEC to implement, particularly if it had applied the 
methodology set forth in the staff guidance. Better analysis, in turn, could 
perhaps have led to more effective, more efficient, or less costly 
regulations. 
A. RISK MANAGEMENT CONTROLS FOR BROKERS OR DEALERS 
WITH MARKET ACCESS 
The Risk Management Rule requires brokers and dealers offering their 
customers direct access to an exchange or alternative trading system (ATS) 
to establish, document, and maintain a system of risk management controls 
and supervisory procedures to limit the financial, legal, and operational 
risks of the broker or dealer and ensure compliance with regulatory 
requirements.100 Direct access allows customers of a broker-dealer—such as 
hedge funds and mutual funds—to conduct electronic trades directly using 
the broker-dealer’s access credentials on exchanges or alternative trading 
systems, without the delay associated with having the broker-dealer effect 
the trade for them. Under the rule, the required controls must be reasonably 
designed to prevent the entry of orders that are erroneous, exceed certain 
credit and capital thresholds, or violate regulatory requirements.101 The rule 
also includes an annual review requirement and an annual chief executive 
officer certification requirement.102 
This rule received a Report Card score of 15 out of 60—close to the 
average for the seven pre-guidance rules we reviewed. There is little 
evidence in the Federal Register notice that the economic analysis affected 
any significant SEC decisions. The SEC’s analysis could have been 
improved in several concrete ways that would have made it more useful for 
the SEC’s decision-making. 
1. Systemic Problem 
The SEC failed to identify with precision the nature and extent of the 
problem that it was setting out to solve. Instead, the SEC cited the so-called 
“flash crash” of May 6, 2010, as evidence that problems can spread quickly 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Risk Management Controls Release, supra note 76, at 69,795. 
 101. Id. at 69,794.  
 102. Id. at 69,811.  
 
2014] SEC Regulatory Analysis 389 
through the securities markets and identified some high-level benefits that it 
anticipated as a result of the rule.103 The notice104 states that “[t]he 
Commission believes that Rule 15c3-5 should reduce the risks faced by 
broker-dealers, as well as the markets and financial system as a whole, as a 
result of various market access arrangements” but does not explain what 
those risks are or attempt to quantify them.105 The notice cites generally to 
the SEC’s desire to prevent “potentially severe, widespread incidents that 
could arise as a result of inadequate risk controls on market access.”106 The 
notice also anticipates that “these financial and regulatory risk management 
controls should reduce risks associated with market access and thereby 
enhance market integrity and investor protection in the securities 
markets.”107 The SEC asserted—rather than established—the link between 
market access controls and investor confidence.108 
To obtain a better understanding of the magnitude of the problem, the 
SEC could have undertaken a systematic search of erroneous trades and its 
relationship to direct customer access using, at least in part, publicly 
available data. Indeed, the notice mentions that “certain exchanges provide 
a searchable history of erroneous trade cancellations on their website, which 
indicate that erroneous trades occur with some regularity.”109 In addition, 
the SEC easily could have obtained additional information about erroneous 
trades from the exchanges that the SEC regulates. 
Another facet of justifying the rule could have included considering the 
extent and adequacy of the controls that the notice acknowledges many 
broker-dealers already have in place.110 If controls such as the automatic 
rejection of trades above a certain size or checks to ensure that customers 
are not exceeding their credit limits reduce risks, broker-dealers already 
have substantial incentives to voluntarily adopt access controls. In framing 
the problem, the SEC should have looked at how many broker-dealers had 
systems in place and the efficacy of those systems, information that the 
SEC could have obtained from the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Id. at 69,794. For a discussion of the flash crash, see STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND SEC, 
FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010: REPORT OF THE STAFFS OF THE 
CFTC AND SEC TO THE JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES 
(2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf. 
 104. Unless otherwise noted, “notice” refers to a notice of final rulemaking. The SEC typically 
uses the alternative term “release.” 
 105. Risk Management Controls Release, supra note 76, at 69,794. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id.  
 108. See, e.g., id. at 69,823 (“Rule 15c3-5 should promote confidence as well as participation in 
the market by enhancing the fair and efficient operation of the U.S. securities markets, thus 
promoting capital formation.”).  
 109. Id. at 69,794 n.16.  
 110. Id. at 69,798–99 (noting that for certain broker-dealers, the rule’s requirements “should be 
substantially satisfied by existing risk management controls and supervisory procedures already 
implemented”).  
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(FINRA), the quasi-governmental regulatory organization that regulates 
broker-dealers.111 Because the SEC regulates FINRA, it has access to 
FINRA data. 
2. Alternatives 
The SEC did not consider alternatives to the approach it took. Given 
that many broker-dealers already implement market access controls, the 
SEC could have considered an alternative rule targeted at the firms that do 
not currently have such controls. Such an approach would have avoided 
imposing additional costs on firms with effective controls in place. The 
SEC also could have considered ways to establish incentives for firms to 
implement controls without an SEC prescription. For example, a rule 
providing that enforcement sanctions would be higher for broker-dealers 
that experienced problems and did not have effective controls in place could 
be effective at motivating firms to improve their controls. In setting 
penalties in its enforcement cases, it is common for the SEC to consider 
whether firms made a good faith attempt to establish effective procedures to 
prevent illegal conduct.112 Alternatives that rely on, rather than displace, 
existing firm rules would also help to avoid one-size-fits-all approaches, 
which can diminish the effectiveness and increase the cost of rules. 
The SEC also could have looked at the role that exchanges and ATSs 
can play in fostering effective risk management. The SEC could have 
looked at the rules that govern participation in those venues to see whether 
certain rules were more effective than others, as well as whether 
adjustments in rules at the exchange/ATS level would suffice. The SEC 
recognized a role for other rule makers when it explained that the rule “is 
intended to complement and bolster existing rules and guidance issued by 
the exchanges and [FINRA]”113 but did not extend this reasoning to 
consider whether those rules could be strengthened. Commenters suggested 
placing the onus for risk management on exchanges and ATSs, which—
before the rule was adopted—routinely provided risk management tools to 
                                                                                                                 
 111. See What We Do, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/WhatWeDo/ (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2014) (“FINRA’s mission is to safeguard the investing public against fraud and bad 
practices. We pursue that mission by writing and enforcing rules and regulations for every single 
brokerage firm and broker in the United States, and by examining broker-dealers for compliance 
with our own rules, federal securities laws and rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking 
Board.”). 
 112. See, e.g., Stephen L. Cohen, Assoc. Dir. of Enforcement, SEC, Remarks at SCCE’s 
Annual Compliance & Ethics Institute (Oct. 7, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539872783#.UwOI-NGYbmI (“You need to 
be armed with the knowledge of how law enforcement and regulatory agencies value the genuine 
efforts undertaken by companies to generate a culture of integrity and respect for the law. We care 
and we give credit for those efforts.”). 
 113. Risk Management Controls Release, supra note 76, at 69,794.  
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broker-dealers.114 The SEC dismissed this option without clearly explaining 
why it was inferior to the final rule.115 
3. Economic Consequences 
The SEC could have used the fact that there were two sets of firms—
one with controls and one without—to assess the effects the rule would 
have. Controlling for other variables, it could have conducted a rigorous 
comparison of broker-dealers with and without controls. The results would 
have helped to establish not only whether there is a link between absence of 
controls and trading problems, but also what the consequences of 
mandating controls might be. 
B. SECURITIES WHISTLEBLOWER INCENTIVES AND PROTECTIONS 
The Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections rulemaking 
implements a new Dodd-Frank regime for processing tips to the SEC and 
compensating people who provide original information to the Commission 
that forms the basis of successful enforcement actions.116 In actions that 
generate monetary sanctions of more than $1 million, these whistleblowers 
must receive ten to thirty percent of the amount collected.117 The basic 
elements of the whistleblower program were prescribed by Dodd-Frank, but 
the SEC made a number of discretionary decisions about key program 
details.118 
This rulemaking received the highest score among the pre-guidance 
rules we reviewed. It is also unique in its heavy citation to some of the 
relevant whistleblower literature.119 The volume, breadth, and scope of 
academic whistleblower literature reflect the complexity of determining 
whether whistleblower programs provide the intended results and, if so, 
what characterizes effective whistleblower regimes. The effects of 
monetary incentives on a broad range of behaviors, including 
whistleblowing, have been widely studied.120 The SEC should be 
commended for looking to some of the relevant literature to guide its 
                                                                                                                 
 114. See id. at 69,799 (citing relevant comments).  
 115. Id.  
 116. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Release, supra note 77. 
 117. Id. at 34,300, 34,328.  
 118. See id. at 34,300. 
 119. See, e.g., id. at nn.433, 436, 453, 457, 459. 
 120. See, e.g., Edward Deci et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the 
Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSYCH. BULL. 627, 627, 659 (1999) 
(analyzing 128 studies on the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation across a wide 
variety of situations and concluding “that strategies that focus primarily on the use of extrinsic 
rewards do, indeed, run a serious risk of diminishing rather than promoting intrinsic motivation”); 
Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURVS. 589, 589 (2001) 
(surveying empirical work on the effects of monetary incentives in a broad range of situations on 
intrinsic motivation). 
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thinking, but it missed many opportunities to make use of that literature in 
its analysis.121 
Much of the available literature critically analyzes and draws lessons 
from other whistleblowing statutes. These include the IRS whistleblower 
program, which underwent some changes in 2006; the federal False Claims 
Act, which has been in existence since the Civil War; the whistleblower 
provision in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement 
Act of 1989;122 and state false claims acts.123 The SEC could have taken 
greater advantage of other government experiences with whistleblower 
programs to design and predict the effects of its program.124 Where the 
SEC’s program is different from its forerunners—for example, the barriers 
for SEC whistleblowers are comparatively low—the analysis should have 
explored the implications of these differences.125 
                                                                                                                 
 121. The SEC’s approach resulted in its failure to cite literature, even when it supported the 
SEC’s analysis. For example, the SEC cited an article for a secondary point that it could have used 
to support its conclusions that monetary awards—even those paid to whistleblowers who are 
involved in the illegal conduct—are a useful mechanism for “enhanc[ing] the quality of the 
regulatory system governing corporations.” Robert Howse & Ronald J. Daniels, Rewarding 
Whistleblowers: The Costs and Benefits of an Incentive-Based Compliance Strategy, in DECISION-
MAKING IN CANADA 525, 539, 545 (Ronald J. Daniels & Randall Morck eds., 1995). The notice 
cited this article for the point that tying the award to the penalty amount may provide an incentive 
for whistleblowers to delay. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Release, supra 
note 77, at 34,357 n.439. The article goes on later to present counterarguments on that point, but 
the SEC does not cite these counterarguments. Howse & Daniels, supra, at 535–36 (arguing that 
the risks that another whistleblower will emerge or that evidence will disappear works to 
counteract delay). 
 122. 12 U.S.C. § 1831k (2012) (permitting banking agencies to award up to “25 percent of the 
amount of the fine, penalty, restitution, or forfeiture or $100,000, whichever is less” to a person 
who provides original information leading to recovery of criminal fine, restitution, or civil penalty 
under relevant banking statutes). 
 123. See generally Patrick A. Barthle II, Whistling Rogues: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Bounty Program, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1201 (2012) (discussing 
the history of whistleblower programs); Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do 
Good and Get Rich: Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. 
L. REV. 273, 275–83 (1992) (discussing the history of whistleblower programs). 
 124. The SEC, for example, downplayed the relevance of data generated under the False Claims 
Act by pointing to the relative lenience of the SEC’s program. See Securities Whistleblower 
Incentives and Protections Release, supra note 77, at 34,327 n.232 (“It is not clear that data about 
whistleblower behavior under the False Claims Act necessarily will be an accurate predictor of 
behavior under our program. The barriers to participation as a False Claims Act whistleblower are 
appreciably higher than in our program . . . .”). 
 125. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, SEC, Statement at Open Meeting to Adopt Final 
Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (May 25, 2011) [hereinafter Statement of Paredes at Opening Meeting to Adopt Final 
Rules], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch052511tap-item2.htm (arguing 
that the fact that the SEC’s program is more lenient than the False Claims Act should have served 
as a warning “that the final rule does not do enough to efficiently filter out lower-quality 
submissions”). 
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1. Systemic Problem 
The whistleblower rule was mandated by Congress, and the SEC did 
not analyze the problem it was trying to solve. Even before the 
whistleblower rule was in effect, the SEC received many tips from 
whistleblowers,126 so the problem might have been the SEC’s inability to 
effectively identify tips worth pursuing. Encouraging more tips through a 
whistleblower program would not solve that problem, and could make it 
worse. The SEC’s pre-Dodd-Frank whistleblower compensation program 
was quite limited in scope,127 so the SEC could have compared the volume, 
timeliness, and quality of its own tips to the volume, timeliness, and quality 
of tips received by other agencies with more generous whistleblower 
programs to assess whether there was a problem that needed to be solved. 
One experimental study found, for example, that the need for awards falls 
with the perceived severity of the wrongdoing and concluded, “In areas 
where the misconduct is likely to be viewed, at least by some of the people, 
as severe, there is less need to use rewards that carry both monetary costs 
for the state and some social costs for the whistle-blower herself.”128 In any 
case, thinking through the nature and extent of the problem would have 
helped the SEC to craft a more effective whistleblower program. 
2. Alternatives 
Assuming that the problem that the rule was designed to solve is that 
the SEC is not receiving adequate, high-quality tips, there are alternatives to 
monetary whistleblower awards. For example, the SEC could have looked 
at the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley) on 
whistleblowing—which included a new avenue for people with accounting 
and auditing complaints to raise them with the audit committee, as well as 
new protections for accounting whistleblowers against retaliation—and 
considered whether a preferable alternative to the rule would have been 
enhanced protections for whistleblowers.129 The adopting release noted 
                                                                                                                 
 126. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Names New Specialized Unit Chiefs and Head of New 
Office of Market Intelligence (Jan. 13, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010 
/2010-5.htm (discussing the new Office of Market Intelligence, which was created to handle “the 
thousands of tips, complaints and referrals received by the SEC each year”). 
 127. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (permitting the SEC to pay bounties for insider trading tips); see also 
SEC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., NO. 474, ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC’S BOUNTY PROGRAM 
(2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/reports/audits/2010/474.pdf (assessing 
the effectiveness of the SEC’s pre-Dodd-Frank whistleblower program in light of other 
government agencies’ programs and making recommendations for improving it). 
 128. See, e.g., Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative 
Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. 
REV. 1151, 1204–05 (2010) (describing the social cost to the whistleblower as the social stigma 
associated with monetary awards).  
 129. One study that the SEC cited for another point looked at fraud cases before and after 
Sarbanes-Oxley and found that “SOX’s protection for whistleblowers has not increased 
employees’ incentives to come forward with cases of fraud” but noted, “This is not to say that the 
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Sarbanes-Oxley’s emphasis on effective internal whistleblowing 
frameworks but stopped short of exploring the degree to which prior 
government efforts to encourage whistleblowing had been 
successful.130Another alternative to whistleblowing that has been suggested 
in the literature and should have been considered by the SEC is permitting 
insider trading on information about corporate misconduct.131 Offering 
lower penalties to people involved in securities law violations who report 
them to the SEC might be another reasonable alternative to a whistleblower 
award program. 
The SEC did consider some different ways of crafting whistleblower 
awards. For example, the SEC, in explaining its decision not to mandate 
that whistleblowers report to internal compliance programs before or at the 
same time as they report to the SEC,132 explicitly referred to the economic 
analysis section.133 In the rules we reviewed, this is one of the few instances 
in which economic analysis seems to have played an explicit role in the 
decision-making process. The economic analysis suggested that mandatory 
internal reporting could discourage some whistleblowers who might be 
willing to report to the SEC but fear reprisal or other harassment if they 
report internally.134 It is not clear if this economic analysis was done before 
the Commission made its decision, but it is difficult to see how the SEC 
could have made the decision without employing logic similar to the 
economic analysis. For this use of economic reasoning in one facet of the 
regulation, the whistleblower regulation received a score of 3 points on the 
Report Card criterion that assesses whether the Commission claimed to use 
the economic analysis in any decisions. This is the highest score any of the 
SEC regulations achieved for this criterion. 
Despite this relative strength, the whistleblower regulation’s economic 
analysis failed to consider as an alternative mandatory internal reporting, 
                                                                                                                 
legislation has not influenced employee whistleblowing by other measures.” Alexander Dyck et 
al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2250 (2010). 
 130. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Release, supra note 77, at 34,326 
n.230 (discussing the Sarbanes-Oxley requirements but noting that, in Dodd-Frank, “Congress 
chose a wholly different model—one that provides financial incentives for employees and others 
to report violations directly to the Commission.”). 
 131. See Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical Analysis of 
Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1921 (2007) (“Insider trading can 
accomplish the same socially desirable results as whistleblowing.”); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, 
Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud 
Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 151–53 (2007) (discussing the possibility of permitting 
whistleblowers to engage in insider trading as one way of motivating whistleblowers—the point 
for which the SEC cited Professor Rapp’s article). 
 132. The SEC explained that “the final rule relies on whistleblowers to determine whether 
reporting potential securities violations internally would be appropriate or desirable at their entity  
. . . .” Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Release, supra note 77, at 34,331 
n.274. 
 133. Id. at 34,326 n.225.  
 134. Id. at 34,361 n.459.  
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together with rewards for whistleblowers who report internally but not to 
the SEC. Such an approach might have been a way to minimize costs to the 
SEC, 135 whistleblowers, 136 and companies.137 In support of its decision not 
to require mandatory internal reporting, the SEC relied on articles that 
argued generally in favor of monetary awards as a means for compensating 
whistleblowers for the adverse consequences of whistleblowing but did not 
address the specific issue of allowing rewards for whistleblowers who 
report only internally.138 For insight in this area, the SEC could have looked 
at different state experiences.139 The SEC also could have considered 
alternatives to mandated awards of ten to thirty percent of monetary 
sanctions.140 Although the statute prescribed this range, considering 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r, SEC, Statement Regarding the Adoption of Rules for 
Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (May 25, 2011) [hereinafter Statement of Casey on Adoption of Rules], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch052511klc-item2.htm. (“Unlike a company engaged in 
the act of self-policing, the Division must observe numerous legal formalities that are required of 
government actors. As a consequence, the public investigative process can be substantially more 
ponderous and time-consuming than private investigative processes. And there is a danger in not 
addressing matters quickly and decisively. By diverting tips and complaints from private channels 
to the Commission, we may end up permitting violations to last longer and grow more serious.”). 
 136. See, e.g., James Gobert & Maurice Punch, Whistleblowers, the Public Interest, and the 
Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, 63 MOD. L. REV. 25, 53 (2000) (looking at benefits and 
drawbacks of whistleblowing in the context of a British whistleblower protection statute and 
noting one potential drawback of governmental encouragement of whistleblowing: “In a society 
where one cannot distinguish between friends, neighbours and co-workers, on the one hand, and 
government informers, on the other, social cohesion and trust are likely to become the victims”). 
An article cited several times in the notice discusses that many whistleblowers, “likely driven by 
[their] sense of loyalty,” may prefer internal whistleblowing to external whistleblowing. See 
Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley: Structural Model to Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 
2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1107, 1142. Another article, cited by the SEC in support of another point, 
suggests that companies could mitigate the “conflict of interest” that monetary awards pose for the 
employee motivated by loyalty to his company by offering monetary awards to internal 
whistleblowers. Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 123, at 335. 
 137. See Moberly, supra note 136, at 1156–57 (explaining that whistleblower error, which may 
be intentional or unintentional, is a cost of whistleblowing, but that the cost may be lower for 
companies if the erroneous tip is handled internally). 
 138. See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Release, supra note 77, at 34,361 
n.459 and accompanying text (citing Pamela H. Bucy, Information as a Commodity in the 
Regulatory World, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 905, 948–59 (2002); Luigi Zingales, Want to Stop Corporate 
Fraud? Pay Off Those Whistle-Blowers, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2004, at B2). 
 139. See, e.g., Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They 
Working?, 25 AM. BUS. L.J. 241, 262–63 (arguing, based on an assessment of state laws, that 
provisions requiring internal mandatory reporting, if “balanced by more liberal remedies for 
whistleblowers who suffer retaliation when they proceed internally . . . , would be approaching a 
well-balanced and useful whistleblowing statute”); Gerard Sinzdak, Whistleblower Laws: 
Defending a More Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1633, 1668 
(arguing for more flexibility, including allowing rewards to be made to whistleblowers who use 
either internal or external channels exclusively, based on an assessment of state whistleblower 
statutes). 
 140. The SEC does not, for example, appear to have considered the arguments made in a 
lengthy comment by David Ebersole, which was later published in a law review. He addressed 
many aspects of the statute and proposed rules. Among the concerns he raised was the ten percent 
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different formulations could have provided useful information to the SEC, 
the public, and Congress. 
3. Economic Consequences 
The notice does not include a thorough, supported analysis of the rule’s 
costs and benefits. Its statements about costs and benefits appear to be 
based largely on conjecture rather than on academic literature or 
experiences from other whistleblower programs. The SEC relied on staff 
expectation to determine some direct costs.141 To gain a better 
understanding of indirect costs, the SEC could have drawn from insights 
about costs and benefits from a well-researched study that it cited for the 
proposition that monetary awards would increase the whistleblower pool.142 
An important indirect cost of the rule could be the effect on companies’ 
internal compliance programs. The SEC used literature arguing that 
whistleblowers are motivated by non-monetary factors to contend that 
whistleblowers would continue to report internally, despite the availability 
of the SEC’s whistleblower awards, yet also used literature on the 
importance of monetary awards to support the prediction that the SEC’s 
rule—which takes internal reporting into account when determining award 
size—would encourage more internal reporting.143 To justify this conflict, 
the SEC raised the possibility that there are two sets of whistleblowers—
one that is motivated by money and one that is not—and explained that the 
rule would work for both groups, but in doing so the SEC did not 
                                                                                                                 
floor on awards. David Ebersole, Blowing the Whistle on Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions, 
6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 123, 143 (2011) (“[A]lthough whistleblower bounties 
are likely to be unnecessarily high with little marginal utility, they ironically may not provide 
certainty as intended.”). 
 141. See, e.g., Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Release, supra note 77, at 
34,354 n.422 (“This number is a staff estimate based upon the expectation that roughly 10 percent 
of all tips received by the Commission will be submitted in hard copy . . . .”); id. at 34,355 n.427 
(basing its estimate that five percent or fewer whistleblowers would pay their lawyers hourly fees 
rather than contingency fees “in part, on the Commission’s belief that most whistleblowers likely 
will not retain counsel to assist them in preparing the forms”).  
 142. See id. at 34,360 n.457 (citing Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 123, at 284). Callahan and 
Dworkin found that the effectiveness of an award turns on the nature of the grantor and award. 
Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 123, at 296–97. They also noted that there are “practical costs 
associated with this privatization of the law enforcement function, in addition to the policy 
concerns.” Id. at 336. 
 143. Compare Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Release, supra note 77, at 
34,360 & n.453 (citing literature finding that whistleblowers are not financially motivated in 
support of the conclusion that whistleblowers would not be induced by financial incentives to 
report to the SEC rather than internally), with id. at 34,360 & n.457 (“The financial incentives 
offered by the final rules to report internally should induce individuals to report who, absent any 
financial incentive, would never have reported either internally or to the Commission.”). 
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adequately explore the strength of its underlying assumptions about the 
existence and likely behavior of these two groups.144 
The SEC goes so far as to suggest that the whistleblower rule will help 
companies, but the Commission does not offer support for this expectation. 
The agency anticipated, for example, that the rule’s monetary awards 
“should increase the likelihood that individuals will report misconduct to 
effective internal reporting programs” and hence the likelihood that 
companies would invest more in improving their compliance programs.145 
The notice asserts that companies that “may previously have underinvested 
in internal compliance programs may respond by . . . strengthening their 
internal compliance programs,” which “will involve costs on companies,” 
but “there should be an overall increased efficiency from the perspective of 
investors to the extent that these companies achieve a more optimal 
investment in these programs.”146 The SEC does not provide evidence that 
companies are underinvesting now in internal compliance or that the 
existence of the whistleblower program will incentivize the optimal amount 
of investment in internal compliance at underinvesting companies. 
Although the SEC could get access to information about typical defense 
costs, it instead “makes no effort to quantify with specificity the impact of . 
. . the defense costs of companies . . . as they are forced to hire outside 
counsel to represent them before the Division of Enforcement.”147 
The SEC also failed to fully consider the implications that a 
whistleblowing program could have on the attorney-client relationship. 
Attorney-client privilege considerations led the SEC generally to preclude 
awards based on attorney-client information.148 Nevertheless, the SEC did 
not consider the extent to which permitting attorneys to be paid for 
whistleblowing, albeit under limited circumstances, could “cloud their 
professional judgment.”149 As another example, the rules permit the SEC 
staff to communicate directly with whistleblowers rather than 
                                                                                                                 
 144. See id. at 34,360 (explaining that “we have tailored the final rules to provide 
whistleblowers who are otherwise pre-disposed to report internally, but who may also be affected 
by financial incentives, with additional economic incentives to continue to report internally”).  
 145. Id. at 34,325–26.  
 146. Id. at 34,362. The notice cites an article in support of the possibility that its rules would 
cause issuers that had underinvested in corporate governance to make “improvements in corporate 
governance generally,” id., but that article found that governance improvements only occurred in 
the firms that were “exposed in the press,” which is not a component of the SEC’s whistleblowing 
program. Id. at 34,362 n.467 (citing Robert M. Bowen et al., Whistle-Blowing Target Firm 
Characteristics and Economic Consequences, 85 ACCT. REV. 1239, 1266 (2010).  
 147. Statement of Casey on Adoption of Rules, supra note 135. 
 148. See Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Release, supra note 77, at 34,313 n.117 
(explaining general exclusion of “information received in breach of the attorney-client privilege” 
because “the attorney-client privilege stands apart because of the significance of attorney-client 
communications for achieving compliance with the Federal securities laws”). 
 149. Barry R. Temkin & Ben Moskovits, Lawyers as Whistleblowers Under the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform Act: Ethical Conflicts Under the Rules of Professional Conduct and SEC 
Rules, 84 N.Y. ST. B.J. 10, 12 (2012). 
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communicating through the attorney for the whistleblower’s employer, as 
would normally be required.150 The notice explains, “We believe that these 
rules provide benefits by ensuring that whistleblowers are able to work with 
the Commission as it takes actions in response to possible securities law 
violations, and thus justify any costs on companies.”151 The so-called no-
contact rule—the prohibition on going around a company’s counsel and 
speaking directly with a company employee—is a fundamental rule 
governing attorney conduct.152 The SEC should have drawn on the literature 
exploring that prohibition and the experiences of other government agencies 
to better understand the costs and benefits of lifting the prohibition in the 
whistleblower context.153 In addition, the Commission should have 
considered the effect that the rule’s provisions related to whistleblower 
lawyers would have on the efficacy and cost of the rule. 
The SEC did not adequately consider the potential costs of the 
whistleblower program to investors and the government, acknowledging 
that “whistleblowers might be paid with monies that otherwise could be 
distributed to victims” but making no effort to look at the resultant costs.154 
Commissioner Paredes, citing to the higher thresholds for submissions 
under the False Claims Act, expressed concern that the rule would impose 
costs on the SEC in the form of “an excessive flow of lower-quality tips to 
the Commission,” which could then divert the SEC’s time and resources 
from more important matters.155 The government’s resource commitment to 
sorting through and following up on complaints is likely to be large,156 and 
the SEC did not fully analyze this commitment. 
The SEC’s failure to conduct a thorough regulatory analysis for the 
whistleblower rule is especially notable because of the broad availability of 
academic work in this area, much of which is based on evaluations of other 
                                                                                                                 
 150. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17(b) (2014). 
 151. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Release, supra note 77, at 34,358. 
 152. See MODEL R. PROF’L CONDUCT 4.2 n.7, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_prof
essional_conduct/rule_4_2_communication_with_person_represented_by_counsel.html 
(explaining, “In the case of a represented organization, this Rule prohibits communications with a 
constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the 
organization’s lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with 
respect to the matter or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to 
the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability.”). 
 153. See, e.g., Alafair S. R. Burke, Reconciling Professional Ethics and Prosecutorial Power: 
The No-Contact Rule Debate, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1635 (1994); Joan Colson, Comment, Rule of 
Ethics or Substantive Law: Who Controls an Individual’s Right to Choose a Lawyer in Today’s 
Corporate Environment, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1265 (2005). 
 154. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Release, supra note 77, at 34,348. 
 155. Statement of Paredes at Opening Meeting to Adopt Final Rules, supra note 125.  
 156. Bucy, supra note 138, at 967; see also Anthony Heyes & Sandeep Kapur, An Economic 
Model of Whistleblower Policy, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 157 (2009) (demonstrating the importance 
of understanding whistleblower motives in shaping the appropriate governmental response to 
tips). 
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whistleblower programs.157 Although the adopting release cited much of 
this work, it did not use it to form the basis of a comprehensive look at the 
need for a whistleblower program and the elements that should be included 
in the design of such a program. This failure could result in an ineffective 
whistleblower program or one that produces unintended negative 
consequences.158 
C. SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND 
GOLDEN PARACHUTE COMPENSATION 
The Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden 
Parachute Compensation rulemaking was mandated by section 951 of 
Dodd-Frank.159 The rule requires companies to conduct shareholder 
advisory votes on (1) executive compensation, (2) the frequency of this 
executive compensation vote, and (3) golden parachute agreements in 
connection with mergers and acquisitions.160 Although the votes are 
nonbinding, the SEC added a requirement that companies disclose whether 
and how they have taken shareholder advisory votes into account.161 Dodd-
Frank permitted the Commission to exempt any “issuer or class of issuers” 
from these requirements.162 The SEC provided only a temporary exemption 
for small companies (which Dodd-Frank explicitly mentioned as potential 
candidates for exemption) with respect to one portion of the rule.163 
This rule received a Report Card score of 15 out of 60—close to the 
average for the seven pre-guidance rules we reviewed. The SEC’s analysis 
was hampered by its reliance on the statutory mandate to justify the 
portions of the rulemaking that were not explicitly discretionary. The fact 
that Dodd-Frank mandated a particular course of action for the SEC does 
not alter the need for the SEC to understand the problem it is trying to 
solve. An understanding of the nature of the problem is essential in order to 
determine whether a proposed solution will work. Likewise, the fact that 
                                                                                                                 
 157. For a sampling of this literature, see supra notes 126–140. 
 158. See, e.g., Feldman & Lobel, supra note 128, at 1154 (“Most strikingly, our findings 
suggest that legal incentives to report are frequently ill-designed and can in fact be inadvertently 
counterproductive.”). 
 159. Shareholder Approval Release, supra note 74. 
 160. Id.  
 161. See id. at 6016 (discussing rationale for the requirement that companies disclose “whether 
and, if so, how their compensation policies and decisions have taken into account the results of the 
most recent shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation”).  
 162. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(e) (2012). The SEC also has general exemptive authority under the 
Securities Exchange Act. Id. § 78mm. 
 163. Shareholder Approval Release, supra note 74, at 6031 (discussing rationale for temporary 
exemption); but see Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, SEC, Statement at Open Meeting to Adopt a Final 
Rule Regarding Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute 
Compensation (Jan. 25, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011 
0/spch012511tap-3.htm (recommending permanent exemption for small and newly public 
companies). 
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Dodd-Frank mandated a particular solution to the problem does not alter the 
need to look at alternatives. The SEC has exemptive authority that allows it 
some leeway to depart from the mandate,164 but even if it were not to 
exercise that authority, the agency, Congress, and the public should know 
whether there is a preferable alternative to the one set forth in Dodd-Frank. 
Congress has the ability to veto agency rules under the Congressional 
Review Act,165 and one obvious thing legislators may want to know in order 
to decide whether to use that veto power is whether there is a better 
alternative available. 
In a more thorough consideration, the SEC could have taken advantage 
of a large literature on executive compensation and corporate governance. 
Among other things, academics have looked extensively at issues related to 
agency problems and asymmetric information in the governance of publicly 
held corporations.166 The SEC would have had to look at this literature in 
the context of its existing mandates, including extensive compensation 
disclosure requirements. 
1. Systemic Problem 
The notice explains that the rules will provide companies with clarity 
about how to comply with the statute and will facilitate investor decision-
making167 but does not explore whether there was a problem justifying the 
rule’s voting and disclosure mandates. To the contrary, some of the SEC’s 
analysis suggests there may not have been a problem. For example, with 
respect to golden parachute disclosure, the SEC acknowledged that “our 
existing disclosure requirements include much of this disclosure.”168 
Similarly, the SEC’s conclusion that new tabular disclosure requirements 
for executive compensation would impose only “limited” costs since the 
same information “is currently required to be disclosed in narrative format” 
raises questions about the necessity for the new disclosure.169 
In addition to looking at the adequacy of its existing executive 
compensation disclosure requirements, the SEC also ought to have looked 
beyond its regulatory framework to determine whether other private or 
                                                                                                                 
 164. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(e). 
 165. 5 U.S.C. § 802. 
 166. For a general introduction to the literature, see ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, 
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Michael S. 
Weisbach, The State of Corporate Governance Research, 23 REV. FIN. STUDS. 939 (2010). See 
also Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Executive 
Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71 (2003); Eugene F. Fama & Michael 
C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1983); Andrei Shleifer & 
Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997). 
 167. Shareholder Approval Release, supra note 74, at 6038–39. 
 168. Id. at 6039.  
 169. Id.  
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government solutions were effectively at work. If boards of directors set 
executive compensation in light of market factors, there may not be a need 
for the government to take further steps such as those taken in this 
rulemaking.170 As part of understanding whether there was a problem to be 
solved, the SEC also would have needed to look at the efficacy of existing 
mechanisms—including state law and exchange-listing requirements—for 
shareholders to monitor and control board and management activities.171 
2. Alternatives 
The adopting release did not consider viable alternatives to the rule. 
The SEC could have looked at ways to foster improved corporate 
governance through internal corporate mechanisms, which would have 
allowed for better tailoring to individual company characteristics. As an 
alternative to mandatory votes, the SEC could have considered opt-in or 
opt-out procedures to allow for more flexible implementation.172 An 
alternative to a uniform rule would have been a rule scaled to size or limited 
to the biggest companies.173 The SEC also could have considered the costs 
and benefits of modifying its existing disclosure requirements to provide 
any additional necessary information to investors without also requiring 
shareholder advisory votes. 
                                                                                                                 
 170. See, e.g., Steven N. Kaplan, Are U.S. CEOs Overpaid?, ACAD. MGMT. PERSP., May 2008, 
at 15, available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/steven.kaplan/research/kceo.pdf (arguing that 
market forces, board oversight, existing SEC disclosure rules, and existing avenues for 
shareholders to express discontent obviate the need for a mandatory, non-binding shareholder vote 
on executive compensation). 
 171. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance 
Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1809–10 (2011) (discussing the “immense” literature on 
whether executive compensation is properly linked with performance and concluding that a 
regulatory solution was not warranted because “[t]he core premise behind say-on-pay remains, at 
best, unproven”); Jill E. Fisch, Leave it to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of Corporate 
Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 758 (2013) (arguing that, with respect to Dodd-Frank’s say-
on-pay provision, “[f]ederalism thus directly interferes with Delaware’s private ordering 
approach”); see generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: 
Lessons from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1834–35 (2006) (recommending that on an 
issue-by-issue basis, “federal policymakers should examine whether: (1) the existing state law 
arrangement is optimal, and (2) any of the tools that are now unavailable at the state level—rules, 
agency involvement, public enforcement, criminalization, duties on agents not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the state of incorporation—would be superior. Most importantly, this review should 
not proceed under the prevailing strong presumption that corporate affairs should normally be left 
to state law absent compelling reasons to intervene.”). 
 172. See, e.g., Jeffrey Gordon, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in 
Financial Firms: The Case for Convertible Equity-Based Pay, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 834 
(recommending an opt-in approach); Minor Myers, The Perils of Shareholder Voting on Executive 
Compensation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 417 (2011) (recommending an opt-out approach). 
 173. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the UK Experience and the 
Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. LEGIS. 323 (2009) (discussing differences between 
small and large firms that could affect the benefits generated by particular compensation rules). 
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3. Economic Consequences 
The SEC’s analysis of costs and benefits of the rulemaking is not 
thorough because it focuses largely on the elements of the rules over which 
the SEC had discretion. In some cases, the SEC’s burden estimates are quite 
precise (e.g., $400 per hour for “outside professionals” to prepare 
disclosures)174 but are not sourced. Moreover, the SEC did not take into 
account non-paperwork costs, such as the costs of hiring outside 
consultants,175 because those costs are attributable to the statutory mandate 
rather than the implementing rules.176 
The discussion of costs largely ignores potential costs of the rule that 
are harder to quantify. The new advisory votes mandated by the rule are a 
step towards the federalization of corporate law, thus potentially imposing 
greater costs on corporations and their investors than would a state law 
regime.177 The SEC’s analysis omits any discussion of the fact that more 
disclosure is not always preferable for investors and could be harmful to 
them.178 The SEC does not consider whether the additional disclosures will 
impose costs on investors. Extraneous disclosures can distract investors’ 
attention from more important items.179 An item that receives great 
                                                                                                                 
 174. Shareholder Approval Release, supra note 74, at 6035. 
 175. The Chamber of Commerce’s Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness raised some of 
these additional costs in its comment letter. Letter from David T. Hirschmann, President and Chief 
Exec. Officer, Ctr. for Capital Mkts. Competitiveness of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Nov. 18, 2010), available at https://www.sec.gov/comments 
/s7-31-10/s73110-47.pdf. 
 176. Shareholder Approval Release, supra note 74, at 6039 (“Our analysis of the costs of the 
amendments we are adopting today relates to the incremental direct and indirect costs arising from 
the requirements in our rule amendments. The analysis below does not reflect any additional direct 
or indirect costs arising from new Exchange Act Section 14A, including the shareholder advisory 
votes on say-on-pay, frequency, and golden parachute compensation, and any likely additional 
costs which would be incurred because of these votes.”). 
 177. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 171, at 782 (“State regulation of corporate governance and 
Delaware corporate law in particular offer substantive and structural advantages over federal 
regulation. These advantages include specialized lawmaking structures with expertise in business 
law issues, the capacity to respond to market and legal developments, and the ability to tailor 
governance structures to firm- specific needs and characteristics.”). 
 178. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff & Claire M. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 599, 624 (2013) (arguing that, rather than informing investors, executive compensation 
disclosure may benefit executives, who “can use fuller access to the details about compensation of 
their peers in negotiations to ratchet up their pay”); Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of 
Disclosure Regulation and Other Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 511 (2007) (arguing 
that disclosure mandates impose costs, including “unintended behavioral responses [that] may 
whittle away the value of increased disclosure”); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: 
Information Overload and its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 
(2003) (arguing that disclosure mandates should not be imposed without thinking about the users 
of the information, who may suffer from information overload). 
 179. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448–49 (1976) (“Some information is of 
such dubious significance that insistence on its disclosure may accomplish more harm than good . 
. . . [I]f the standard of materiality is unnecessarily low, not only may the corporation and its 
management be subjected to liability for insignificant omissions or misstatements, but also 
management’s fear of exposing itself to substantial liability may cause it simply to bury the 
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emphasis in SEC-mandated disclosures may figure more heavily into 
investment decisions than it would have absent the disclosure emphasis. 
This phenomenon is intensified in the area of corporate disclosures because 
of the involvement of proxy advisory firms.180 Proxy advisory firms, which 
provide voting recommendations, focus heavily on executive compensation 
issues,181 so they could drive investors to pay even more attention to these 
items than they otherwise would.182 
The SEC’s discussion of benefits is largely speculative. The notice 
states, for example, that the rulemaking “will benefit shareholders and other 
market participants by providing potentially useful information for voting 
and investment decisions.”183 Similarly, the SEC speculates, “By providing 
disclosure of the full scope of golden parachute compensation, we believe 
issuers will provide more detailed, comprehensive, and useful information 
to shareholders to consider when making their voting or investment 
decisions.”184 As noted above, this discussion assumes that existing 
disclosures are inadequate without explaining why that is the case. Without 
more information, it is not clear if the SEC is correct in concluding that “the 
amendments we are adopting should improve the ability of investors to 
make informed voting and investment decisions, and, therefore lead to 
increased efficiency and competitiveness of the U.S. capital markets.”185 
With respect to both costs and benefits, the SEC could have looked to 
the experiences of companies that obtained government funding through the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Entities with outstanding TARP 
funds were required to permit a separate shareholder vote on executive 
compensation.186 The SEC noted the similarity of the requirement187 but did 
not draw on companies’ experience with TARP (albeit limited given that 
the TARP requirement had only recently been imposed) to better 
                                                                                                                 
shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information—a result that is hardly conducive to informed 
decisionmaking.”). 
 180. See Fisch, supra note 171, at 754–55 (discussing the role of proxy advisory firms in 
influencing say-on-pay advisory votes). 
 181. James K. Glassman & J. W. Verret, How to Fix Our Broken Proxy Advisory System, 
MERCATUS CENTER GEO. MASON U., 14–15 (Apr. 16, 2013), http://mercatus.org/sites/default 
/files/Glassman_ProxyAdvisorySystem_04152013.pdf (discussing proxy advisors’ focus on say-
on-pay issues). 
 182. For a discussion of reliance on proxy advisors, see Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, SEC, 
Remarks at Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals (July 11, 2013), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539700301#.Uv-WwnmA2P8 
(arguing, among other things, that “[a]nother unintended consequence of the increase in mandated 
disclosure is the rise of proxy advisory firms and the increasing willingness of investment advisers 
and large institutional investors to rely on such firms in order to ostensibly carry out their 
fiduciary duties”). 
 183. Shareholder Approval Release, supra note 74, at 6038. 
 184. Id.  
 185. Id. at 6040–41. 
 186. 12 U.S.C. § 5221(e) (2012). 
 187. Shareholder Approval Release, supra note 74, at 6023. 
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understand its implications. The SEC also could have looked at the United 
Kingdom’s experience with say-on-pay.188 
D. LARGE TRADER REPORTING 
The Large Trader Reporting rulemaking requires large traders, as 
measured by the volume or value of their trading, to identify themselves to 
the SEC, provide extensive information to the SEC, and obtain from the 
SEC an identification number.189 The large trader must supply this 
identification number to its registered broker-dealers for use in their 
recordkeeping and reporting to the SEC.190 The rulemaking also requires 
broker-dealers to monitor for unidentified large traders.191 The rulemaking 
was authorized under section 13(h) of the Exchange Act192 and motivated 
by the Commission’s desire to have better information about market 
transactions.193 The SEC adopted the rule—which had already been 
proposed—shortly after the “flash crash” of May 6, 2010, rattled the agency 
and markets and raised questions about the SEC’s ability to reconstruct 
market events.194 This rule received a Report Card score of 14 out of 60, 
which made it one of the lowest-scoring rules in our sample. 
1. Systemic Problem 
The SEC, in its notice, made an attempt to outline a problem by 
pointing to gaps in its current information collection system, the Electronic 
Blue Sheets.195 Existing blue sheet data did not allow the SEC to trace a 
transaction to a particular trader or identify when it occurred.196 Moreover, 
the SEC pointed to the fact that data were not required to be available to the 
SEC the day after a transaction occurs.197 The SEC asserted that these 
shortcomings in the blue sheet data were the problem it was trying to solve 
but did not take the analysis to the necessary next step and explain how 
having the data would solve a problem in market function. If mere lack of 
access to information were the type of problem the SEC needed to solve 
through rulemaking, the SEC could cite that as the basis for an infinite 
number of rulemakings. Rather than simply expressing an expectation “that 
                                                                                                                 
 188. See Gordon, supra note 173. 
 189. Large Trader Reporting Release, supra note 76. 
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investors should likewise benefit as a consequence of the Commission’s 
enhanced access to information,”198 the SEC should have explored how 
having the missing information would enhance the SEC’s ability to 
facilitate well-functioning markets. The SEC could have analyzed, for 
example, how its response to the flash crash would have been different with 
access to large trader information. Moreover, instead of simply pointing to 
the apparently “increasingly prominent role” of large traders,199 the SEC 
should have considered more thoroughly what had changed to make the 
data necessary; Congress first gave the SEC authority to request the 
information in 1990,200 but the SEC waited until 2011 to finalize a rule. 
The SEC’s failure to pinpoint the problem it was attempting to solve 
made the development of an effective solution more difficult. For example, 
the SEC’s decision to require aggregation among companies with a 
common parent, regardless of whether there is coordination of investment 
discretion, could undermine the value of the information for purposes of 
reconstructing market events.201 The SEC mentioned the fact that the CFTC 
has a large trader reporting requirement202 but did not look to the CFTC’s 
long experience with this requirement to explain the SEC’s need for a 
similar obligation. 
2. Alternatives 
The SEC appears to have settled on its solution without giving even-
handed consideration to alternatives. The Commission could have looked at 
modifying other SEC or FINRA information collection requirements. The 
SEC also could have considered a coordinated approach with international 
regulators interested in the same type of information. One commenter 
suggested relying on changes to FINRA’s Order Audit Trail System 
(OATS) instead of making changes to the SEC’s Electronic Blue Sheets.203 
FINRA, which is the frontline regulator of brokers, maintains an audit trail 
system that “is designed to capture all of the events in the lifecycle of an 
                                                                                                                 
 198. Id. at 46,993–94.  
 199. Id. at 46,993.  
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 201. See id. at 46,965 (explaining decision to apply at the parent level regardless of where the 
investment discretion lies); see also Letter from Jennifer S. Choi, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Inv. 
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 202. Large Trader Reporting Release, supra note 76, at 46,978. 
 203. See Letter from Ann L. Vlcek, Managing Dir. and Assoc. Gen. Counsel, SIFMA, to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 5–6 (June 24, 2010), available at 
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order from origination or receipt through execution and/or cancellation.”204 
This audit system might have been modified to obtain the information 
sought by the SEC with respect to large traders. Instead of giving that 
option due consideration in response to a commenter’s suggestion, the SEC 
took the commenter’s cost estimates out of context and concluded that the 
commenter’s letter did not support the OATS alternative.205 The commenter 
preferred OATS because it anticipated that OATS investments would 
generate greater benefits in the long term and reduce future expenditures in 
connection with the anticipated consolidated audit trail rulemaking.206 The 
consolidated audit trail rulemaking, then under consideration and 
subsequently adopted by the SEC, is an initiative intended to provide for the 
collection of comprehensive trade data across market venues and is thus 
related to the large trader reporting rule.207 
Alternatively, the SEC could have considered the option of deferring its 
large trader information requests and incorporating them directly into the 
consolidated audit trail rulemaking. The notice included a brief discussion 
of the consolidated audit trail rulemaking but argued that the large trader 
rule was a necessary, near-term way to get the SEC the information it 
needed.208 The adopting release did not take into account the potential costs 
associated with implementing two such closely related rules in quick 
succession. 
The SEC also could have considered adopting a more limited form of 
the rule. For example, it could have required large traders to identify 
themselves only after they had established a pattern of engaging in large 
trades. The SEC could have considered other ways to limit the reach of the 
definition of “large trader” to better capture the types of traders in which it 
was interested. With respect to foreign large traders, the SEC could have 
                                                                                                                 
 204. Order Audit Trail System (OATS): OATS Basics, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry 
/Compliance/MarketTransparency/OATS/PhaseIII/p016184 (last visited Apr. 11, 2014) (slide 3). 
 205. Large Trader Reporting Release, supra note 76, at 46,990 (pointing out that the commenter 
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 207. Consolidated Audit Trail, Exchange Act Release No. 67,457, 77 Fed. Reg. 45,722 (Aug. 1, 
2012) [hereinafter Consolidated Audit Trail Release]. The SEC noted in that rulemaking that 
certain aspects of the large trader rule could be rendered superfluous by the consolidated audit trail 
rule. Id. at 45,734. 
 208. Large Trader Reporting Release, supra note 76, at 46,963–64. 
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considered the option of obtaining the information it needed from their 
home country regulators.209 
3. Economic Consequences  
The adopting release states that “the Commission has designed the 
proposed [sic] rule to minimize the burdens of the large trader reporting 
requirements on both large traders and registered broker-dealers.”210 The 
SEC did make some accommodations in response to concerns about the 
rule’s burdens outweighing its benefits. For example, the SEC eliminated 
the requirement that large traders report their account numbers in response 
to concerns from commenters about the burden and impracticability of 
reporting account numbers.211 More broadly, however, it is unclear that the 
SEC did the requisite work to understand those burdens.  
The adopting release includes baseline work to estimate the number of 
affected large traders and broker-dealers and the burdens, but the basis for 
those estimates is uncertain.212 The SEC acknowledged that broker-dealers 
would be required to make certain information technology expenditures to 
comply with the rule213 and estimated that initial implementation efforts 
would take firms an aggregate of 133,500 hours at a cost of $106,060 per 
broker-dealer.214 In reaching this estimate, the SEC looked to the number of 
new disclosure items—two—rather than to the complex nature of one of the 
two new items—transaction execution time.215 One firm estimated that it 
would cost $3–4 million, but the SEC explained, without sufficient 
supporting data, that its own lower estimate was an average across firms.216 
                                                                                                                 
 209. This option was suggested in a comment letter on the proposed rule. See Letter from Guido 
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The SEC’s analysis omitted serious consideration of certain costs. The 
rule requires broker-dealers to monitor for unidentified large traders and 
affords a safe harbor to broker-dealers that set up policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to detect unidentified large traders.217 Thus, even a 
broker-dealer that is unlikely to have large trader customers might decide—
out of an abundance of caution—to avail itself of the safe harbor, which 
would entail costs that the SEC does not take into account. Also relevant 
are downstream costs—the costs that broker-dealers covered by the rule 
will impose on traders in order to ensure the covered broker-dealers’ 
compliance.218 The SEC attempted to limit the type of information that it 
required in order to avoid necessitating requests to other broker-dealers,219 
but it also required broker-dealers to treat customers as large traders if they 
have “actual knowledge” that they are. This obligation is likely to inspire 
broker-dealers to take protective steps to avoid violating the rule, including 
requiring entities with which they interact to put protective measures in 
place; indeed, the rule’s safe harbor is premised on strong policies and 
procedures. The SEC does not account for the costs of these measures.220 
The SEC likewise may have underestimated the difficulty that parent 
companies would have, in light of information barriers, in obtaining 
information from subsidiaries.221 The SEC concluded that if a parent 
company found too difficult the task of aggregating information to 
determine whether it qualifies as a large trader, the company “may elect to 
register voluntarily as a large trader.”222 Doing so would require the parent 
company to obtain even more—albeit different—information from 
affiliated entities. 
The SEC did not give serious consideration to less easily quantifiable 
costs of the rulemaking, such as the possibility that the extensive 
information provided by large traders to the SEC could be compromised to 
the competitive detriment of the large traders. The SEC promised to 
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“protect[] the confidentiality of that information to the fullest extent 
permitted by applicable law,”223 but a recent data breach by staff in an SEC 
office charged with market monitoring suggests that the possibility of 
information being compromised is not so remote.224 The notice also did not 
give much consideration to the rule’s potential to shift trading. The 
adopting release remonstrated a commenter for failing to provide data to 
support its contention that large traders might shift to securities not covered 
by the new regulation in order to avoid its burdens but did not offer data to 
support its counter-contention.225 
E. NET WORTH STANDARD FOR ACCREDITED INVESTORS 
The Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors rulemaking 
implements section 413(a) of Dodd-Frank, which directed the SEC to adjust 
the net worth standard for accredited investors under the Securities Act to 
exclude the value of an investor’s primary residence.226 Generally, under 
the securities laws, issuers (such as companies, hedge funds, and private 
equity funds) are able to offer and sell securities to accredited investors 
without triggering costly SEC registration requirements.227 One type of 
accredited investor—the one addressed in this rulemaking—is an individual 
or couple that qualifies by virtue of having a net worth greater than $1 
million.228 The SEC’s new net worth standard calculation excludes the 
value of the primary residence and indebtedness associated with the primary 
residence to the extent the indebtedness does not exceed the value of the 
house.229 The rulemaking also includes some related technical amendments. 
This rule received a Report Card score of 14 out of 60, which made it 
one of the lowest-scoring rules in our sample. The exclusion of the value of 
primary residences from the net worth calculation was immediately 
effective upon enactment of Dodd-Frank, and the SEC’s rulemaking 
reflected that change in its rules without asking more fundamental questions 
about the standard.230 The SEC did not look at the outcomes that standard 
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was trying to achieve, the problems that stood in the way of achieving them, 
or whether there might have been a better way to solve those problems. The 
rulemaking analyzed only the costs and benefits of its specific amendments, 
such as whether it should grandfather existing investors and whether and to 
what degree it should exclude from the net worth calculation mortgage debt 
along with the value of the home.231 Dodd-Frank, however, gave the SEC 
leeway—after conducting analysis—to make adjustments to the statutory 
definition as it “may deem appropriate for the protection of investors, in the 
public interest, and in light of the economy.”232 The SEC declined to 
exercise that authority,233 but the existence of the authority underscores 
congressional interest in understanding the effects of the standard. 
Conducting an analysis of the statutory standard would have helped to 
elucidate those effects. 
1. Systemic Problem 
The problem the statutory mandate and the rulemaking were seeking to 
address was presumably tied to the fact that the rapid increase in housing 
prices before the financial crisis enabled people who had not previously 
qualified as accredited investors to meet the accredited investor threshold. 
The adopting release does not mention this issue or look at whether the 
broadening of the accredited investor category through the increase in home 
values resulted in investor harm. 
The fact that a new set of individuals generally not previously able to 
purchase private securities were able to purchase them because of the 
increase in home values provided the SEC with a useful natural experiment. 
The SEC could have looked at whether these newly qualified investors took 
advantage of their ability to buy securities previously off limits to them and, 
if so, whether and how these investors were harmed. It would also have 
been useful to look at whether sellers of these securities targeted this newly 
qualified group of investors aggressively or, of their own volition, excluded 
investors who would have qualified as accredited solely by virtue of their 
home equity. These inquiries, which the SEC could have conducted with 
the assistance of FINRA and state securities administrators, would have 
helped the SEC, Congress, and the public to assess the reasonableness of 
limiting access to investments based on wealth. An inquiry of this sort 
might also have shed light on the extent to which an investor who has 
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 232. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 413(b)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 1376, 1577–78 (2010). 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2012) and 17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (2014)). This 
discretionary provision allows for an “initial review and adjustment” of the term. A separate 
provision requires a review of the definition of “accredited investor” “in its entirety” at least every 
four years beginning four years from the enactment of Dodd-Frank. Id.  
 233. Net Worth Standard Release, supra note 74, at 81,795 (explaining the Commission’s 
decision to wait until the Government Accountability Office completes a related study before 
considering whether to modify the statutory definition). 
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become accredited largely because of a rapid increase in home prices is in 
need of greater protection than an investor who has become accredited due 
to a rapid increase in the price of gold or the value of his stock portfolio. 
2. Alternatives 
The accredited investor standard, which is primarily rooted in wealth or 
income rather than financial sophistication, has long been controversial, as 
it excludes most individual investors from a whole set of investments.234 As 
a consequence, some have suggested non-wealth-based accredited investor 
standards.235 The SEC could have considered whether shifting to an explicit 
financial sophistication standard or an investment diversification 
requirement would be a better way to protect investors. The SEC already 
uses the financial sophistication of the buyer or his representative as a 
criterion under Rule 506, which permits securities to be sold to a small 
number of certain non-accredited investors.236 Alternatively, the SEC could 
have considered whether the existing FINRA suitability rule, pursuant to 
which broker-dealer representatives selling securities must make only 
suitable recommendations to their customers, was sufficient to protect 
investors or whether it could be amended to require heightened care when 
the bulk of an investor’s wealth was made up of home equity.237 The SEC 
did consider the suitability rule in determining whether to require mortgage 
debt to be included if the proceeds were used to purchase securities.238 The 
SEC also did not consider whether additional provisions of Dodd-Frank that 
require private fund advisers to register with the SEC and be subject to SEC 
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examination239 may have made adjustments to the net worth standard 
unnecessary. 
3. Economic Consequences 
The SEC’s analysis of the economic consequences of the rulemaking 
was limited to the clarifications that it made. The SEC asserted that its 
clarifying rules promote efficiency and reduce the cost of raising capital.240 
It also noted that its approach expanded the pool of potential purchasers and 
thus lowered costs to issuers by allowing for the exclusion from the 
calculation of mortgage debt along with the value of the home.241 The SEC 
looked at the difference between excluding all mortgage debt and excluding 
only the debt up to the value of the home and found that there was “no 
material difference” in the number of affected households.242 The SEC 
could have used the same data source—the Federal Reserve Board Survey 
of Consumer Finances—to look more broadly at the question of how many 
fewer households would qualify under the new net worth standard. It could 
have used that information to consider whether issuers would face 
heightened costs as a result of the decreased pool of investors. 
F. REPORTING BY INVESTMENT ADVISERS ON FORM PF 
In a joint rulemaking, the SEC and the CFTC adopted rules under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the Commodity Exchange Act that 
would require SEC-registered investment advisers managing $150 million 
or more in private fund assets to file a new form with the SEC —Form 
PF—to provide information to regulators about the adviser and its private 
fund clients.243 Form PF collects detailed information about the funds’ types 
of investments, owners, and counterparties.244 Form PF comprises four 
sections, the first of which must be completed by any SEC-registered 
adviser that manages one or more private funds and has—together with its 
related persons—at least $150 million in assets under management.245 
Section 2 must be completed by large hedge fund advisers, meaning those 
with at least $1.5 billion in hedge fund assets under management.246 Section 
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3 must be completed by large liquidity fund advisers, meaning those with at 
least $1 billion in money market and liquidity fund assets under 
management.247 The fourth section must be completed by large private 
equity fund advisers, meaning those with at least $2 billion in private equity 
fund assets under management.248 Large hedge fund and liquidity fund 
advisers are required to update Form PF quarterly, and smaller advisers and 
private equity fund advisers must file annually.249 
Form PF responds to a Dodd-Frank provision that authorizes the SEC 
to collect information from investment advisers to private funds “as 
necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of 
investors, or for the assessment of systemic risk by the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC),”250 and it directs the SEC and the CFTC to 
conduct a rulemaking.251 Form PF is intended to “provide FSOC and the 
Commissions with important information about the basic operations and 
strategies of private funds and help establish a baseline picture of potential 
systemic risk in the private fund industry.”252 In addition, the CFTC and 
SEC anticipate that Form PF will provide them with the information they 
need to devise further regulations for, and better target examinations of, 
private funds.253 
As the notice explains, FSOC is “at the center of a framework” 
designed to prevent another costly financial crisis, and Form PF’s primary 
purpose is to help to ensure FSOC has adequate information to carry out its 
mission.254 Dodd-Frank charged FSOC, a multi-regulator council that 
includes the chairmen of the SEC and CFTC, with “identify[ing] risks to the 
financial stability of the United States.”255 Among FSOC’s responsibilities 
is the designation for additional regulatory supervision of nonbank financial 
companies that could pose risks to the financial system.256 Nonbank 
financial companies include private funds.257 
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ROTHSTEIN KASS, 1 (May 2012), http://www.rkco.com/getattachment/a7b9592c-210b-4358-b2cb-
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Performing the analysis for a rule that is primarily designed to serve 
another agency is a difficult task, and the Report Card score for this 
rulemaking—18 out of 60—reflects this difficulty. As the following excerpt 
from the notice suggests, the rule seems primarily a response to the 
perceived needs of FSOC rather than a solution to a clearly identified 
problem: 
The policy judgments implicit in the information required to be reported 
on Form PF reflect FSOC’s role as the primary user of the reported 
information for the purpose of monitoring systemic risk. The SEC would 
not necessarily have required the same scope of reporting if the 
information reported on Form PF were intended solely for the SEC’s use. 
We expect the information collected on Form PF and provided to FSOC 
will be an important part of FSOC’s systemic risk monitoring in the 
private fund industry . . . . In its most recent release on this subject, FSOC 
confirmed that the information reported on Form PF is important not only 
to conducting an assessment of systemic risk among private fund advisers 
but also to determining how that assessment should be made.258 
In explaining why particular decisions were made, the notice of final 
rulemaking repeatedly refers to “our staffs’ consultations with the staff 
representing the members of FSOC.”259 FSOC relies largely on staff drawn 
from the agencies that FSOC members head, presumably including staff of 
the SEC and CFTC.260 Because the nature of the staff-level conversations is 
typically not discussed in any detail, the rationale for the collection of 
particular types of information remains unclear. 
1. Systemic Problem 
The notice does not clearly identify a systemic problem that the rule is 
intended to solve. Rather, while acknowledging Congress’s recognition that 
private funds are not generally believed to have played a major role in the 
                                                                                                                 
5326d44ad368/FSOC-Issues-Final-Rule-on-Systemically-Significant (explaining that “both fund 
managers and their private funds generally fall within the definition of a nonbank financial 
company”).  
 258. Reporting by Investment Advisers Release, supra note 75, at 71,129–30 (footnotes 
omitted). 
 259. See, e.g., id. at 71,129; see also id. at 71,131 n.243 (“[B]ased on our consultation with staff 
representing FSOC’s members, we believe that turnover will provide important insight into the 
role of hedge funds in providing trading liquidity in certain markets.”).  
 260. See Frequently Asked Questions, FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 11, 2014) 
(Response to “How does FSOC operate?”: “The Council operates under a committee structure to 
promote shared responsibility among the member agencies and to leverage the expertise that 
already exists at each agency . . . . The Council also maintains a small, independent staff to 
provide advice on statutory authorities and obligations, and to manage its document flow, records 
retention, and public records disclosure. This staff also includes policy experts to help coordinate 
the work of the committees and, where appropriate, complex inter-agency rule makings, to 
support Council functions such as designations, and to draft reports to Congress.”). 
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last financial crisis, it points out that having data about private funds could 
be useful in the next crisis.261 To the extent that systemic risk is the problem 
driving the rule, the SEC acknowledges that Form PF is not, in and of itself, 
an antidote to systemic risk.262 
Elsewhere, the notice suggests that the rule might be aimed at solving 
other problems—excessive risk-taking by hedge funds that imposes 
negative externalities and improper capital allocation.263 The SEC seems to 
anticipate that Form PF may help to curb socially harmful risk-taking by 
imposing costs in a way that will force firms to internalize the costs of that 
risk-taking.264 In citing as a potential benefit of the rule the allocation of 
“capital to investments with a higher value to the economy as a whole” 
flowing from improved risk management,265 the SEC seems to be 
identifying improper allocation of capital as a problem. The SEC does not 
provide the information necessary to demonstrate that hedge fund risk-
taking is imposing externalities, that hedge funds are misallocating capital, 
or that Form PF is the appropriate solution to those problems. 
The analysis of the underlying problem should have distinguished 
among different types of funds. Private equity funds, for example, are very 
different from hedge funds and do not pose the same types of risks.266 
Although the “SEC acknowledges that several potentially mitigating factors 
suggest that private equity funds may have less potential to pose systemic 
risk than some other types of private funds,” it goes on to state that such 
differences are not relevant because  
[t]he design of Form PF . . . is not intended to reflect a determination as to 
where systemic risk exists but rather to provide empirical data to FSOC 
                                                                                                                 
 261. Reporting by Investment Advisers Release, supra note 75, at 71,164 (citing S. REP. NO. 
111–176, at 38 (2010)). 
 262. Id. at 71,165 (citing FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT ii 
(2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/FSOCAR2011.pdf) 
(noting that “although collecting information on Form PF will increase the transparency of the 
private fund industry to regulators (an important prerequisite to understanding and monitoring 
systemic risk), transparency alone may not be sufficient to address systemic risk”).  
 263. Id. at 71,116 (explaining that private fund investors and advisers stand to benefit from 
better risk management as a result of Form PF). 
 264. Id. at 71,171 (“[T]he uneven distribution of the benefits and costs of Form PF reflects the 
potential for an uneven distribution of the costs and benefits of engaging in risky financial 
activities that may impose negative externalities . . . .”).  
 265. Id. at 71,166 (“The SEC believes that private fund advisers may, as a result, assess more 
carefully the risks associated with particular investments and, in the aggregate, allocate capital to 
investments with a higher value to the economy as a whole.”).  
 266. See, e.g., Jennifer Payne, Private Equity and Its Regulation in Europe, 12 EUR. BUS. ORG. 
L. REV. 559, 585 (2011) (arguing that private equity funds were being treated like hedge funds for 
European regulatory purposes although “the business models (and systemic risk implications) of 
private equity and hedge funds are quite distinct”). 
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with which it may make a determination about the extent to which the 
activities of private equity funds or their advisers pose such risk.267 
2. Alternatives 
The notice identified five alternatives that were considered, but these 
reflected variations on the same regulatory approach rather than distinct 
alternatives.268 More distinct approaches exist and could have been 
considered. For example, if private funds’ interactions with other financial 
institutions are the area of greatest concern, then obtaining information 
from private funds’ counterparties—many of which already provide a lot of 
information to the government—about their exposure to private funds could 
provide regulators with more relevant information at a lower cost. As others 
have suggested, an alternative approach could rely on private monitoring 
through hedge funds’ prime brokers—typically large, heavily regulated 
financial institutions: 
There is, however, an alternative mechanism for using private information 
about hedge fund positions for the purpose of measuring systemic risk, i.e. 
via prime brokers. They observe the whole trading activity of client hedge 
funds, and often run its risk engines. Given their involvement in 
counterparty risk, they have a strong incentive to monitor fund exposures 
closely. Such continuous monitoring can provide early warning signs for 
systemic risk. While this is essentially a market solution, supervisors, who 
already regulate the prime brokers, could require that prime brokers fulfill 
such a function.269 
                                                                                                                 
 267. Reporting by Investment Advisers Release, supra note 75, at 71,153 (citing Eilís Ferran, 
The Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private Equity: A Case Study in the Development of the EU’s 
Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis, (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 
176, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1762119 (supporting the proposition that one 
need not limit remedial measures taken in response to a crisis to the areas that caused the last 
crisis)). While that is correct, the SEC still needs to identify the problem it is trying to solve in 
order to determine how to solve it. 
 268. Reporting by Investment Advisers Release, supra note 75, at 71,163 (“Among the 
alternatives that we considered were requirements that varied along the following five dimensions: 
(1) Requiring more or less information; (2) requiring more or fewer advisers to complete the 
Form; (3) allowing advisers to rely more on their existing methodologies and recordkeeping 
practices in completing the Form (or, alternatively, requiring more standardized responses); (4) 
requiring more or less frequent reporting; and (5) allowing advisers more or less time to complete 
and file the Form.”). 
 269. See, e.g., Jón Daníelsson et al., Highwaymen or Heroes: Should Hedge Funds Be 
Regulated; A Survey, 1 J. FIN. STABILITY 522, 537 (2005) (discussing benefits and costs of 
different approaches to hedge fund regulation); see also Michael R. King & Philipp Maier, Hedge 
Funds and Financial Stability: Regulating Prime Brokers Will Mitigate Systemic Risks, 5 J. FIN. 
STABILITY 283, 296 (2000) (pointing to the effectiveness of “[i]ndirect regulation by prime 
brokers and market discipline by creditors, counterparties, and investors” and arguing “that direct 
regulation of hedge funds may not be feasible and is not likely to be effective, due to the delays 
with reporting and processing the information”). 
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The SEC also could have looked at other possible avenues for obtaining 
data. One option would be to expand the existing investment adviser 
registration form, Form ADV, to capture additional information about 
private funds. This alternative would have required protection of 
confidential information, since Form ADV is publicly available but would 
have streamlined advisers’ reporting obligations. Alternatively, the SEC 
could have considered whether the Office of Financial Research, a new 
Dodd-Frank agency established to collect data on behalf of FSOC,270 would 
be better suited to collect information relevant to assessing systemic risk of 
private funds. 
3. Economic Consequences 
The rule’s benefits are described in sweeping, imprecise terms. For 
example, the economic analysis section explained that “if this information 
helps to avoid even a small portion of the costs of a financial crisis like the 
most recent one, the benefits of Form PF will be very significant.”271 A 
more precise linkage of the information being collected to its usefulness in 
minimizing the costs of a financial crisis would have been more helpful to 
the commissions as they decided what information to collect. 
The discussions of direct costs are likewise too imprecise to be of use in 
Commission decision-making. For example, the notice acknowledges that 
“particular advisers may, based on their circumstances, incur burdens 
substantially greater than or less than the estimated averages” but 
anticipates with imprecision that “the average burden of completing Form 
PF is very unlikely to be in the thousands or tens of thousands of hours.”272 
Similarly, the SEC’s estimates for hardware costs were imprecise, ranging 
from an aggregate industry cost of “$0 to $25,000,000 for the first year, 
though the actual cost is likely to fall in between these two end-points.”273 
The economic analysis section states that the SEC made many changes 
to the original proposal intended to reduce cost burdens, in response to 
comments claiming that the estimated cost burdens in the proposal were too 
low. These include extending compliance dates, allowing some firms to 
report annually rather than quarterly, increasing size thresholds for firms 
that need to file, and allowing advisers to use existing data tracking 
methodologies to a greater extent.274 It seems clear that these changes were 
made in response to comments, not because of anything the commissions 
learned from the benefit-cost analysis, and the analysis was then updated to 
reflect the revised regulation. 
                                                                                                                 
 270. 12 U.S.C. § 5343(a)(1) (2012) (describing the role of the Office of Financial Research in 
supporting FSOC by, among other things, “collecting data on behalf of the Council”). 
 271. Reporting by Investment Advisers Release, supra note 75, at 71,166. 
 272. Id. at 71,159 n.395.  
 273. Id. at 71,163.  
 274. Id. 
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In some cases, the SEC concluded that FSOC’s perceived information 
needs obviated the need to estimate costs. For example, in considering 
whether to require a fair value breakdown of assets and liabilities, the SEC 
concluded that advisers that do not already prepare such a breakdown may 
“incur additional costs to complete this question, and we are sensitive to 
their costs. We believe, however, that this question will provide valuable 
information for FSOC’s systemic risk monitoring activities and our investor 
protection mission and that the associated burden is warranted.”275 
Similarly, with regard to a requirement that certain data be reported on a 
monthly basis, the notice concludes:  
Based on our staffs’ consultations with staff representing FSOC’s 
members, we agree with commenters who argued that rapidly changing 
markets and portfolios merit collecting certain information more often 
than on a quarterly basis, and we are not persuaded that the large hedge 
fund and large liquidity fund advisers required to respond to these 
questions will be overwhelmed by this reporting.276 
In order to fully understand the consequences of the rule, the economic 
analysis should have included more than cursory consideration of indirect 
costs. For example, the notice does not take adequate account of potential 
indirect costs of having the government collect information about private 
funds. One potential cost is a decrease in private monitoring because of the 
market’s reliance on increased government monitoring.277 Less monitoring 
by private fund investors and counterparties could lead to heightened risk-
taking. Decreased private sector monitoring might not be offset by 
government monitoring, particularly if the government is unable to use the 
information it collects effectively. 
The SEC should have considered the cost to the government of 
processing and effectively using detailed information about private funds. 
                                                                                                                 
 275. Id. at 71,145 (omitting a footnote that cited to the need for FSOC to understand “the extent 
to which the fund’s value is determined using metrics other than market mechanisms”).  
 276. Id. at 71,151.  
 277. See, e.g., Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 2006 Financial Markets Conference: Hedge Funds and 
Systemic Risk (May 16, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech 
/bernanke20060516a.htm (“As a practical matter, could the authorities collect such an enormous 
quantity of highly sensitive information in sufficient detail and with sufficient frequency (daily, at 
least) to be effectively informed about liquidity risk in particular market segments . . . ? Perhaps 
most important, would counterparties relax their vigilance if they thought the authorities were 
monitoring and constraining hedge funds’ risk-taking?”); see also Houman B. Shadab, Hedge 
Funds and the Financial Crisis, MERCATUS ON POL’Y, Jan. 2009, at 3, available at 
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/RSP_MOP34_Hedge_Funds_and_the_Financial
_Crisis.pdf (“Moreover, additional government oversight may increase complacency, undermine 
ongoing private efforts to improve best practices, and overwhelm regulators with duties beyond 
their resources and abilities.”). 
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Some have suggested that academics could help analyze the information,278 
but confidentiality restrictions make it difficult to share information with 
academics. Including unnecessary items on Form PF could distract FSOC 
from information that would be more relevant to systemic risk assessments. 
The SEC acknowledged that information overload was a possibility when it 
explained, in connection with a decision to separate data by fund strategy, 
that excluding “extraneous information” would enhance the utility of the 
information for FSOC, the SEC, and the CFTC.279 This concern, however, 
seems not to have informed the rest of the analysis, which is infused with a 
more-is-better approach to information collection rather than a careful 
consideration of whether collecting particular information would be 
helpful.280 As one example of information that might not be useful, Form 
PF requires data about funds that do not pose a systemic risk.281 
Although the SEC acknowledged the importance of protecting the 
information submitted and discussed possible ways that it would do so,282 
potential compromises to the confidentiality of private adviser information 
were not considered as a potential cost. No matter how carefully the SEC’s 
policies are crafted, there is likely to be a security breach at some point by 
staff or computer systems at the SEC, CFTC, FSOC, FINRA (which 
administers the Form PF filing system), or one of the other regulators to 
which Form PF information is provided.283 Accordingly, this cost should 
have been taken into account. The SEC also did not undertake to determine 
whether the rule would reduce hedge fund activities and their attendant 
                                                                                                                 
 278. Leonard Nakamura, Durable Financial Regulation: Monitoring Financial Instruments as a 
Counterpart to Regulating Financial Institutions 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 17006, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17006.pdf (“To the extent 
consistent with privacy considerations, permitting academics and investment advisors to access 
and analyze the financial database would enhance the capacity to identify cyclic and systemic 
risks within the U.S. financial structure.”). 
 279. Reporting by Investment Advisers Release, supra note 75, at 71,134. 
 280. See, e.g, COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: A 
PLAN FOR REGULATORY REFORM ES-13 (2009), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org 
/pdfs/TGFC-CCMR_Report_(5-26-09).pdf (“[T]he regulator would bear the burden of 
demonstrating its need for the required information as well as its ability to use that information 
effectively.”); Anne Rivière, The Future of Hedge Fund Regulation: A Comparative Approach, 10 
RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 263, 326 (2011) (arguing that the burden of proof should be on 
regulators to show that required data “is necessary to assess systemic risk”). 
 281. Reporting by Investment Advisers Release, supra note 75, at 71,137 (explaining that 
“FSOC would benefit from access to data about funds that, on an individual basis, may not be a 
source of systemic risk”). 
 282. Id. at 71,156. 
 283. See, e.g., SEC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION: INVESTIGATION 
INTO MISUSE OF RESOURCES AND VIOLATIONS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY 
POLICIES WITHIN THE DIVISION OF TRADING AND MARKETS (2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/oig-557.pdf (discussing the unprotected status of certain SEC 
computers); see also Peter Schroeder, Staff Data Leaks out of the SEC, HILL (July 25, 2013), 
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/313387-staff-data-leaks-out-of-the-sec (discussing 
how personally identifiable information of SEC staff was transferred unwittingly to an employee’s 
thumb drive and then to the servers of another government agency). 
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positive externalities.284 The SEC reasoned that performance fees are high 
enough relative to Form PF costs to ensure that private advisers will not 
shut private funds down or attempt to keep them below registration 
thresholds in response to the compliance costs.285 The SEC further opined 
that a private adviser that turned investors away would hurt its reputation 
with investors,286 but hedge funds routinely turn away investors.287 To 
better assess how additional costs would affect the size and number of 
private funds and returns to private fund advisers, the SEC would have to 
consider factors such as how competitive the private fund market is. A 
better understanding of the competitive landscape would have helped the 
commissions to anticipate whether Form PF would affect hedge fund 
investment levels. 
G. RULES IMPLEMENTING AMENDMENTS TO THE INVESTMENT 
ADVISERS ACT OF 1940 
Pursuant to authority granted in Dodd-Frank, the SEC adopted new 
rules and amendments under the Advisers Act.288 First, the rulemaking 
shifts a group of smaller, SEC-registered investment advisers—those with 
between $25 million and $100 million—to state registration.289 Second, the 
rulemaking eliminates certain private fund adviser exemptions from 
registration and reporting requirements.290 Third, the rulemaking requires 
                                                                                                                 
 284. See, e.g., Houman B. Shadab, The Challenge of Hedge Fund Regulation, REGULATION, 
Spring 2007, at 36 (“Academics, industry professionals, and regulatory authorities 
overwhelmingly agree that hedge funds benefit the economy by mitigating price downturns, 
bearing risks that others will not, making securities more liquid, and ferreting out inefficiencies.”). 
Additional regulation, even disclosure regulation, will undermine hedge funds’ traditional 
“latitude and flexibility with respect to investment strategies” that derives from their relative lack 
of regulation. Carl Ackermann et al., The Performance of Hedge Funds: Risk, Return, and 
Incentives, 54 J. FIN. 833, 870 (1999). The SEC did acknowledge that “to the extent that capital 
available for investment is reduced, the companies in which private funds would otherwise invest 
may also bear costs.” Reporting by Investment Advisers Release, supra note 75, at 71,171. 
 285. Reporting by Investment Advisers Release, supra note 75, at 71,170 (noting that the 
agency “believes, however, that substantial economic incentives will likely counter such behavior, 
including private fund performance fees that incentivize the private fund adviser to continue 
advising its funds and maximize fund appreciation and return”). 
 286. Id. (“[W]e anticipate that business relations with investors that may be damaged if the 
adviser turns away investor assets may also motivate advisers to continue to permit the size of 
their funds to increase as a result of new investment . . . .”). 
 287. Bernard Madoff reportedly enhanced his reputation as a money manager by turning 
investors away. See, e.g., The Madoff Affair: Con of the Century, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 2008, at 
119, available at http://www.economist.com/node/12818310 (“Turning away some investors and 
telling those he accepted not to talk to outsiders produced a sense of exclusivity.”). Although 
hindsight shows us that Madoff was perpetrating a fraud, the ease with which he attracted investor 
money suggests that turning potential investors away can bolster an adviser’s reputation. 
 288. Rules Implementing Amendments Release, supra note 75. 
 289. Id. at 42,951–61 (discussing the transition of mid-sized advisers from SEC to state 
registration). 
 290. Id. at 42,961–65 (discussing exempt reporting advisers); id. at 42,975 (discussing the 
narrowing of private adviser exemption). 
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private fund advisers that are exempt from registration—“exempt reporting 
advisers”—to fulfill certain reporting requirements.291 Finally, the 
rulemaking applies the SEC’s pay-to-play rules to exempt reporting 
advisers and foreign private advisers and makes a number of technical 
amendments.292 
This rule received a Report Card score of 14 out of 60, which made it 
one of the lowest-scoring rules in our sample. The SEC’s analysis suffered 
from a lack of precision with respect to objectives and an absence of critical 
assessment of potential consequences of the rulemaking. Rather than 
identifying problems, the SEC relied on Dodd-Frank mandates to justify the 
key pieces of the rulemaking293 and did not conduct related analysis.294 
Even the SEC’s decisions that extended beyond the clear statutory 
mandates were supported only with general references to enhancing the 
SEC’s knowledge base.295 The SEC considered commenters’ suggestions 
about particular registration and reporting items and made some changes in 
response296 but did not carefully consider the implications for the SEC, 
                                                                                                                 
 291. Dodd-Frank exempted venture capital fund advisers and private fund advisers with less 
than $150 million in U.S. assets under management from registration but permitted the SEC to 
impose reporting and recordkeeping requirements on them “as the Commission deems necessary 
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.” Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, §§ 407, 408, 124 Stat. 1376, 1574–75  (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(l), 
(m) (2012)) (adding Adviser Act subsections 203(l) and (m), respectively). Traditionally, 
unregistered advisers have not been subject to extensive reporting requirements, but the SEC 
imposed substantial reporting requirements in this rulemaking. See Jeff Schwartz, The 
Crystallization of Hedge Fund Regulation, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 73, 77 (2011), 
http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Schwartz-HedgeFundReg.pdf (arguing that 
“[t]he requirements for exempt advisers is likely the area where the SEC pushed its authority the 
furthest”). 
 292. Rules Implementing Amendments Release, supra note 75, at 42,974–75 (discussing pay-
to-play amendments). 
 293. Dodd-Frank Act § 410 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3A(a)(2)) (adding new 
section 203A(a)(2) of the Advisers Act to move mid-sized advisers—those required to register 
with and that are subject to examination by their home states, and that have $25–100 million in 
assets under management (or whatever higher threshold the SEC chooses)—to state registration 
from SEC registration); Dodd-Frank Act § 403 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)) 
(amending section 203(b) of the Advisers Act by eliminating private adviser exemption from 
registration); Dodd-Frank Act §§ 407, 408 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(l), (m)) 
(amending section 203 of the Advisers Act by exempting venture capital fund advisers and small 
private fund advisers from registration but authorizing the SEC to impose reporting requirements). 
 294. See, e.g., Rules Implementing Amendments Release, supra note 75, at 42,977 (explaining 
that “[b]ecause many of the new rules and rule amendments will implement or clarify provisions 
of the Dodd-Frank Act, they will not create benefits and costs separate from the benefits and costs 
considered by Congress in passing the Dodd-Frank Act,” and limiting consideration of costs and 
benefits to those not generated by Dodd-Frank). 
 295. See, e.g., id. at 42,983 (explaining that Form ADV “changes will give us a more complete 
picture of an adviser’s practices, help us better understand an adviser’s operations, business and 
services, and provide us with more information to determine an adviser’s risk profile and prepare 
for examinations”).  
 296. See, e.g., id. at 42,958 (“We are persuaded by these comments that a buffer may prevent 
costs and disruption to advisers that otherwise may have to switch between federal and state 
registration frequently because of, for example, the volatility of the market values of the assets 
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investors, and the market of adding substantial numbers of registered and 
reporting private fund advisers to the SEC’s ranks and moving smaller 
advisers to state oversight. 
1. Systemic Problem 
The SEC did not identify the problems this rulemaking is intended to 
solve. One potential problem that could lead to the decision to shift 
investment advisers to state oversight is the increase in the number of 
investment advisers registered with the SEC297 and the Commission’s 
struggle to properly oversee such a large number of firms.298 However, 
another part of the rulemaking—the new registration and reporting schemes 
for private fund advisers that were previously exempt—would exacerbate 
the SEC’s oversight burden, particularly because these advisers are more 
complex than the smallest advisers.299 
A thorough assessment of the problems underlying the rulemaking 
would have been particularly helpful given that the rulemaking marks a 
substantial shift of emphasis for the SEC away from the protection of retail 
investors and towards the protection of private fund investors. Access to 
hedge funds and other private funds is limited to investors who meet certain 
wealth thresholds—thresholds that were increased by Dodd-Frank.300 These 
accreditation requirements are intended to restrict private funds to investors 
who are adequately sophisticated or able to afford knowledgeable advisers 
to find suitable funds for them.301 Moreover, these investors are presumed 
                                                                                                                 
they manage.”); id. at 42,937 (deciding, based on adverse comment, not to “accelerate the 
deadline for filing an annual updating amendment to an adviser’s Form ADV filing”).  
 297. See, e.g., SEC STAFF OF DIV. OF INV. MGMT., STUDY ON ENHANCING INVESTMENT 
ADVISER EXAMINATIONS para. II.A (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011 
/914studyfinal.pdf (reporting that between October 1, 2004, and September 30, 2010, the number 
of registered investment advisers increased 38.5%, from 8581 to 11,888 advisers). It is surprising 
that the SEC does not appear to have employed the findings of this study in its analysis. 
 298. See, e.g., SEC, FY 2014 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION AND ANNUAL 
PERFORMANCE PLAN AND FY 2012 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 29 (2013) [hereinafter FY 
2014 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION AND ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy14congbudgjust.pdf (finding that in fiscal year 2010, the 
SEC examined only nine percent of registered investment advisers.). 
 299. See, e.g., Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, SEC, Statement on Study Enhancing Investment 
Adviser Examinations (Required by Section 914 of Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act) (Jan. 2011), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech 
/2011/spch011911ebw.pdf (“Importantly, as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act, while there will be a 
near-term decrease in the number of registered investment advisers under the Commission’s 
jurisdiction, the staff estimates that net assets under management will increase immediately as 
larger and more complex entities enter the Commission’s oversight.”). 
 300. See supra Part IV.E (discussing these changes). 
 301. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Regulation by Exemption: The Changing Definition of an 
Accredited Investor, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 681, 683 (2008) (“Very generally, an accredited investor is 
an investor who is sufficiently sophisticated so as not to need the protections of the federal 
securities laws, but such an investor generally is defined in terms of wealth, on the theory that an 
accredited investor can hire knowledgeable and sophisticated advisors.”). 
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to be able to bear investment losses.302 Accordingly, the SEC has 
traditionally played a less active investor protection role in the private fund 
area.303 Instead it has allocated its resources to the protection of less 
wealthy retail investors.304 As discussed above, concerns have been 
expressed about the use of wealth as a measure of financial 
sophistication.305 The SEC could have included consideration of these 
concerns in its assessment of the problem the rulemaking was intended to 
solve. 
With respect to the portion of the rulemaking that requires increased 
public disclosures by private fund advisers, the underlying problem is not 
obvious. Prospective private fund investors typically demand information 
from private fund advisers or enlist the assistance of a third party to obtain 
information for them.306 The SEC did not identify the barriers that were 
preventing investors from obtaining the information directly from advisers, 
as one would expect investors to be able to do in a competitive market. 
Indeed, the SEC acknowledges that the information required by this 
rulemaking “is similar to, and at times less extensive than, the information 
that investors in hedge funds and other private funds commonly receive in 
response to due diligence questionnaires or in offering documents.”307 
The SEC hinted that the problem could be the unreliability of the 
information investors are getting when it noted that “it is precisely the 
ability of these [sophisticated] investors to compare Form ADV information 
to the information they have received in offering documents and due 
diligence that makes public disclosure valuable.”308 The SEC did not 
                                                                                                                 
 302. See, e.g., Net Worth Standard Release, supra note 74, at 81,794 (explaining that “[o]ne 
purpose of the accredited investor concept is to identify persons who can bear the economic risk 
of an investment in unregistered securities, including the ability to hold unregistered (and 
therefore less liquid) securities for an indefinite period and, if necessary, to afford a complete loss 
of such investment”) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 81,794 n.17. 
 303. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s 
Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 990 (noting that “the SEC 
traditionally has not stepped in to protect the kinds of wealthy investors and institutions who 
typically invest in hedge funds. Instead, the SEC has deferred to such well-heeled investors to 
protect themselves through market discipline.”). 
 304. Paul S. Atkins, Protecting Investors Through Hedge Fund Advisor Registration, 25 ANN. 
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 537, 551–52 (2006) (explaining that mandatory hedge fund registration 
requirement would shift resources from protecting retail to protecting wealthy investors). 
 305. See Rules Implementing Amendments Release, supra note 75, at 42,969; Karmel, supra 
note 301, at 683. 
 306. See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 303, at 992–93 (discussing due diligence by hedge fund 
investors). 
 307. Rules Implementing Amendments Release, supra note 75, at 42,969. 
 308. Id. at 42,969, 42,964 (“[I]nvestors will be able to compare Form ADV information to the 
information they receive in offering documents and due diligence to identify potential 
misrepresentations.”); see also id. at 42,963 (arguing that limiting the required information to 
“basic identifying data . . . would deny investors an opportunity to verify disclosures they receive 
directly from the adviser”). 
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provide evidence, however, to support the proposition that inaccurate 
information is a significant problem. 
2. Alternatives 
The SEC did not analyze reasonable alternatives to the different 
components of the rule. In a separate Dodd-Frank rulemaking, which was 
discussed above, the SEC adopted Form PF, a form designed to provide 
information to FSOC, the SEC, and the CFTC about private funds.309 As 
discussed in connection with that rulemaking, disclosure on Form ADV 
could serve as an alternative to disclosure on Form PF and vice versa.310 
The SEC also should have considered the degree to which the disclosure 
was unnecessary because it was already required elsewhere.311 Rather than 
dismissing concerns about reporting that was duplicative with Form D 
reporting under the Securities Act, the SEC could have considered whether 
expanded Form D reporting could serve as an alternative to the rule’s Form 
ADV disclosure.312 
The notice explains that reporting by exempt reporting advisers could 
be useful in determining “whether these advisers or their activities might 
present sufficient concerns to warrant our further attention” for investor 
protection reasons.313 As an alternative way to achieve that objective, the 
SEC could have considered relying on tips generated by the new Dodd-
Frank whistleblower program. The whistleblower program could also be 
another route for addressing concerns about misinformation being provided 
to private fund investors. 
To the extent adequate information is not being provided, the SEC 
could have considered working with the industry on a voluntary effort to 
                                                                                                                 
 309. See supra Part IV.G. As discussed in that section, some of the Form PF information might 
have been collected better on Form ADV. The decision about which information should be 
publicly disclosed (Form ADV) versus disclosed only to regulators (Form PF) turns on its 
business sensitivity and usefulness to the general public. 
 310. The SEC acknowledged the connection when it stated that it considered comments made in 
connection with this rulemaking in the Form PF rulemaking. See, e.g., Rules Implementing 
Amendments Release, supra note 75, at 42,967 (“We have considered these comments in the 
context of this rulemaking and have determined to make several changes. We will also consider 
these comments in the context of the Form PF release.”). 
 311. Even within Form ADV there is duplicative reporting. Compare id. at 42,965 
(acknowledging “the new information requirements we proposed to Part 1A of Form ADV 
overlap in some respects with the new brochure requirements” (Part 2 of Form ADV), but noting 
“that the overlap may be necessary as the two parts of Form ADV serve very different purposes”), 
with id. at 42,968 (noting elsewhere in Form ADV that “[b]y requiring [information about 
auditors] in question 23 [of Form ADV], we are able to relieve advisers from the burden of 
reporting similar information”).  
 312. The SEC was “not persuaded that providing this [duplicative] information will 
significantly increase the reporting burden, and the information will assist both the Commission 
and the public in quickly and accurately locating additional relevant information regarding the 
fund.” Rules Implementing Amendments Release, supra note 75, at 42,966 n.230. 
 313. Id. at 42,962.  
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establish best practices for disclosure to investors and potential investors.314 
To the extent the SEC wanted to encourage more public disclosures, it 
could have considered lifting its own prohibition on advertising—a change 
that Congress later directed the SEC to make under the JOBS Act.315 
3. Economic Consequences 
The SEC should have broadened its consideration of the economic 
consequences beyond direct compliance costs. For example, the SEC could 
have considered whether the shift in resource allocation from retail funds to 
private funds would prompt sophisticated investors to rely excessively on 
SEC oversight instead of doing their own homework. If SEC registration is 
perceived to be a seal of government approval on an adviser or a fund, 
investors may curtail their due diligence. The SEC noted that “clients and 
investors may have greater confidence in advisers that provide more 
fulsome disclosure and are subject to our oversight.”316 Given that the SEC 
examined only nine percent of registered investment advisers in fiscal year 
2010, such confidence may be misplaced.317 
The SEC should also have taken into account the role that private funds 
play in the market, the economy and investors’ portfolios, as well as the 
effect that the rulemaking would have on those roles. The Commission 
should have looked at the degree to which private funds contribute to 
market liquidity318 and capital formation.319 Imposing additional costs on 
                                                                                                                 
 314. The Managed Funds Association, for example, publishes a model due diligence 
questionnaire for hedge fund investors. See Model Due Diligence Questionnaire for Hedge Fund 
Investors, MANAGED FUNDS ASS’N, http://www.managedfunds.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06 
/Due-Dilligence-Questionnaire.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2014). 
 315. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201, 126 Stat. 306, 313–15 
(2012); see also Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising 
in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, Exchange Act Release 
No. 69,959, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3624, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771 (July 24, 2013). 
 316. Rules Implementing Amendments Release, supra note 75, at 42,993. 
 317. See FY 2014 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION AND ANNUAL PERFORMANCE 
PLAN supra note 298, at 29. 
 318. See, e.g., Darwin Choi et al., Convertible Bond Arbitrage, Liquidity Externalities, and 
Bond Prices, 91 J. FIN. ECON. 227 (2009), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr 
/Choi_Getmansky_Tookes.pdf (finding that arbitrage in the convertible bond market, in which 
hedge funds are actively engaged, enhances liquidity in the underlying equity markets); Petri Jylhä 
et al., Do Hedge Funds Supply or Demand Liquidity?, 18 REV. FIN. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 
13), available at http://efmaefm.org/0EFMSYMPOSIUM/Toronto-2011/papers/Rinne.pdf 
(finding “that hedge funds seem to supply liquidity when markets are illiquid and use liquidity 
when the markets are liquid so the cost of using liquidity is low”); George Aragon & Philip 
Strahan, Hedge Funds as Liquidity Providers: Evidence from Lehman Bankruptcy (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15336 (2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers 
/w15336.pdf (concluding, based on evidence from the Lehman bankruptcy, that hedge funds act as 
liquidity providers). 
 319. See, e.g., David J. Brophy et al., Hedge Funds as Investors of Last Resort?, 22 REV. FIN 
STUD. 541, 569 (2006) (finding that companies “that obtain equity financing from hedge funds 
tend to be smaller and riskier and are less likely to have analyst coverage compared to firms that 
obtain financing from other investor classes”). 
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advisers to these funds could materially affect these roles. The SEC also 
should have looked at whether the rulemaking might cause advisers to 
relocate outside of the United States and refuse U.S. investors. As a 
corollary, the SEC could have looked at whether limiting the number of 
private fund opportunities available to U.S. investors would hamper their 
ability to deploy their money effectively.320 
The SEC did not fully consider the economic consequences of its 
mandatory disclosures. There are potential competitive implications of 
public disclosure.321 The SEC gave only brief consideration to these 
concerns in response to commenters, who “did not persuade” the SEC that 
it could make the requisite finding to overcome the public disclosure 
presumption for reports filed with the SEC.322 More generally, the SEC 
could have considered the extensive literature discussing the costs and 
benefits of mandatory disclosure.323 
The SEC should have given greater consideration to the implications of 
its reporting requirements for exempt reporting advisers. Without a clear 
basis, the SEC concludes that although “difficult to quantify,” the benefits 
of the exempt reporting adviser reporting requirements “are substantial.”324 
                                                                                                                 
 320. There is literature analyzing whether hedge funds outperform mutual funds and the market 
more generally. See, e.g., Ackermann et al., supra note 284, at 854–55 (concluding that even 
though hedge funds do not outperform market indices on a risk-adjusted basis, “the low beta 
values on hedge funds make them a potentially valuable addition to many investors’ portfolios”). 
 321. Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, SEC, Statement at Open Meeting to Adopt Final Rules 
Regarding Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers with Less 
than $150 Million in Assets Under Management, and Foreign Private Advisers and Final Rules 
Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (June 22, 2011) [hereinafter 
Statement to Adopt Final Rules Regarding Exemptions], available at http://www.sec.gov/news 
/speech/2011/spch062211tap-items-1-2.htm (“[I]t is difficult to identify any appreciable marginal 
investor protection benefit from the public disclosure that the final rule dictates. To the contrary, 
there is reason to worry that at least some of the information might be competitively sensitive and 
that mandating its public disclosure could harm [venture capital] funds and the very investors that 
the rule purports to protect.”). 
 322. Rules Implementing Amendments Release, supra note 75, at 42,963. 
 323. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984) (making an efficiency argument for mandatory 
disclosure); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection 
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984) (assessing arguments in favor of mandatory disclosure 
regulation and arguing that benefits and costs of disclosure regulation should be compared with 
costs and benefits of alternative forms of regulation); Manne, supra note 178, at 511 (arguing that 
“[b]ehavioral responses to regulation, even via mere disclosure, can be costly. Firms and 
managers will endeavor to circumvent costly regulations, regulations will have unintended 
consequences, and dynamic market shifts may undermine much of the regulations’ force. That 
these effects eradicate the benefits of mandatory disclosure is not itself inevitable; that they exist, 
however, is.”); Christian Leuz & Peter Wysocki, Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting 
and Disclosure Regulation: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research (Mar. 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105398 (reviewing disclosure 
literature, discussing firm-specific and macro-economic costs and benefits of voluntary disclosure, 
and discussing costs and benefits of financial reporting and disclosure regulations). 
 324. Rules Implementing Amendments Release, supra note 75, at 42,981. The SEC cites as 
benefits its receipt of “information as to whether these advisers or their activities might present 
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The SEC also anticipates that the new reporting requirements would have a 
positive effect on investor confidence and consequently on capital 
formation: 
Access to the information we are requiring exempt reporting advisers to 
report may also increase clients’ and prospective clients’ trust in 
investment advisers, which may encourage them to seek professional 
investment advice and encourage them to invest their financial assets. This 
may enhance capital formation by making more assets available for 
investment and enhancing the allocation of capital generally.325 
As part of the analysis, the SEC should have considered whether some 
of the anticipated greater confidence might result from a misperception 
about the SEC’s role in verifying the information. Such misplaced 
confidence can lead to inadequate monitoring by investors and inefficient 
capital allocation. As the reaction of Bernard Madoff investors illustrated, 
investors often believe that the SEC is watching advisers more closely than 
it is.326  
With respect to costs, the SEC estimated that the amortized paperwork 
burden over three years for exempt reporting advisers would be 2.67 hours 
but does not provide a clear basis for this assumption.327 More significantly, 
however, the SEC failed to seriously assess potential indirect costs of the 
exempt reporting adviser requirements. One of these, which commenters 
raised, was investor confusion resulting from exempt reporting advisers’ 
use of Form ADV, which has traditionally only been used by registered 
advisers.328 By imposing extensive reporting requirements and pledging to 
conduct routine examinations of these advisers, the SEC “collaps[ed] the 
distinction between what it means to be unregistered versus registered as an 
investment adviser.”329 The Commission faulted commenters for failing to 
“identify any specific costs associated with these concerns”330 and 
concluded that the costs of developing a new system outweighed these 
                                                                                                                 
concerns sufficient to warrant our further attention in order to protect their clients, investors, and 
other market participants” and assistance to “investors and prospective investors in conducting 
due diligence and . . . protect[ing] against fraud.” Id. at 42,982. As noted above, the SEC did not 
establish the underlying problems before imposing these requirements.  
 325. Id. at 43,009.  
 326. See, e.g., Peter Lattman, Court Expresses Antipathy for S.E.C. in Handling of Madoff 
Case, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 10, 2013, 1:37 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/10 
/court-expresses-antipathy-for-s-e-c-in-handling-of-madoff-case/. 
 327. Rules Implementing Amendments Release, supra note 75, at 43,000. As one example, the 
SEC bases its estimate for annual updates to Form ADV by taking an apparently arbitrary, eighty-
five-percent haircut from the one-hour estimate for registered advisers. Id.  
 328. See, e.g., Letter from Seward & Kissel LLP to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 10 (Jan. 
31, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-37-10/s73710-112.pdf (“We believe that 
using the same form for both registered advisers and exempt reporting advisers will create 
confusion among investors.”). 
 329. Statement to Adopt Final Rules Regarding Exemptions, supra note 321. 
 330. Rules Implementing Amendments Release, supra note 75, at 42,990. 
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concerns.331 The SEC also should have considered the opportunity cost of 
the resources that exempt reporting advisers would spend in order to 
comply with these requirements.332 
V. THE SEC’S POST-GUIDANCE PERFORMANCE 
Court decisions striking down SEC regulations due to poor quality or 
insufficient use of economic analysis motivated the Commission staff to 
promulgate new guidance for analysis and restore the chief economist’s 
direct reporting relationship to the chairman.333 It may take time, however, 
for economists to gain full control over the analysis and for the Commission 
to develop experience in using the analysis to make decisions. Thus, 
although approximately two years have passed since the SEC staff released 
its guidance memorandum, it remains too early to determine definitively 
whether the guidance is improving analysis.  
Preliminary evidence is mixed. Although without specific consideration 
of the elements in the staff guidance memorandum, a federal district court 
deemed sufficient the SEC’s analysis in connection with the conflict 
minerals rule—one of the major rules adopted subsequent to the 
guidance.334 As the judge noted, however, the humanitarian objectives of 
the rule at issue distinguished it from other rules that had been invalidated 
in the past.335 In June 2013, in response to a congressional request, the 
SEC’s inspector general issued a report that concluded the SEC’s analysis 
largely followed the guidance, based on a review of twelve regulations 
proposed or finalized after the guidance was issued.336 However, the 
inspector general’s report mostly assessed whether the SEC’s analysis 
                                                                                                                 
 331. Id. at 42,962.  
 332. Dissenting Commissioner Casey explained this cost as follows: 
 
Every dollar that is spent by a venture capital fund to satisfy the Commission’s newly 
imposed regulatory requirements is a dollar that cannot be invested in the next Google, 
Apple, or Amazon. These dollars will never reach nascent companies that are developing 
green tech, cutting-edge biotechnology, or products that are even beyond our dreams today. 
 
Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r, SEC, Statement at SEC Open Meeting—Rules Implementing 
Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940; Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital 
Funds, Private Fund Advisers With Less Than $150 Million in Assets Under Management, and 
Foreign Private Advisers (June 22, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011 
/spch062211klc-items1-2.htm. 
 333.  See supra notes 55–70 and accompanying text. 
 334. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 335. Id. at 57 (noting that prior cases in which the SEC’s economic analysis had been found 
deficient “involved shortcomings on the Commission’s part with respect to the economic 
implications of its actions—economic implications of its actions . . . . By contrast, none of those 
decisions lends support to Plaintiff’s theory that the Conflict Minerals Rule must be invalidated 
because the SEC failed to consider whether the Rule would actually achieve the humanitarian 
benefits identified by Congress.”) (footnote omitted).  
 336. SEC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., USE OF THE CURRENT GUIDANCE ON ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS IN SEC RULEMAKINGS (2013) [hereinafter, SEC OIG POST-GUIDANCE REPORT]. 
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covered specified topics; it did not extensively assess the quality of the 
analysis. To see whether the quality of the SEC’s analysis may have 
improved, we reviewed an important regulation in the inspector general’s 
sample using the Report Card methodology. This preliminary review of one 
regulation suggests that there may be much more room for improvement 
than the inspector general’s report indicates. Once the SEC has finalized 
more major rules, it will be possible to rigorously assess the SEC’s 
progress. 
A. JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF SEC POST-GUIDANCE ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 
One of the major rules adopted after the SEC staff guidance took effect 
implemented the Dodd-Frank mandate to promulgate regulations requiring 
companies to make annual disclosures about the origin of conflict minerals 
“necessary to the functionality or production of a product” they 
manufacture.337 The genesis for the rule was concern for victims of violence 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.338 
The rule was challenged in court on a number of grounds, one of which 
was that the SEC’s economic analysis was allegedly flawed.339 The 
emphasis on economic analysis was not surprising given that one of the 
plaintiffs had estimated that the rule would cost $9–16 billion, in contrast to 
the SEC’s estimate of $71.2 million.340 The plaintiffs also faulted the SEC 
for failing to determine whether the rulemaking would have its intended 
benefits.341 The SEC explained that it was unable to do so given the atypical 
nature of the rule’s objectives: 
The statute therefore aims to achieve compelling social benefits, which we 
are unable to readily quantify with any precision, both because we do not 
have the data to quantify the benefits and because we are not able to assess 
how effective Section 1502 will be in achieving those benefits. 
                                                                                                                 
 337. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213. 
 338. See, e.g., Letter from Richard J. Durbin, U.S. Senator, and Jim McDermott, U.S. 
Congressman, to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC 1 (Oct. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-xv/specialized-disclosures/specializeddisclosures-22.pdf 
(explaining that Congress intended the conflict minerals provision to address the violence in the 
DRC that “has already claimed more than five million lives and continues to result in the death 
and rape of countless new victims”). 
 339. Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief at 26–34, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F. Supp. 2d 43 
(D.D.C. 2013) (No. 13-cv-635), available at 
http://www.nam.org/~/media/B5825277D7C144A48C2C4442054900D4/NAM_v_SEC_brief_onl
y_01162013.pdf. 
 340. Id. at *16.  
 341. Id. at *27–31. 
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Additionally, the social benefits are quite different from the economic or 
investor protection benefits that our rules ordinarily strive to achieve.342 
The court, taking a narrow view of the Exchange Act’s requirement to 
“consider . . . whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation,” held that the SEC did not have to consider whether the 
conflict minerals rule “would actually achieve the social benefits Congress 
envisioned.”343 The court placed great weight on the fact that the regulation 
was the product of “Congress’s determination that the due diligence and 
disclosure requirements it enacted would help to promote peace and 
security in the DRC,” rather than the result of “the Commission having 
independently perceived a problem within its purview and having exercised 
its own judgment to craft a rule or regulation aimed at that problem.”344 The 
SEC, the court held, “rightly maintains that its role was not to ‘second-
guess’ Congress’s judgment as to the benefits of the disclosure.”345 The 
court went on to suggest that, with respect to this particular rule, the SEC 
may not have even been subject to the statutory requirement to consider 
efficiency, competition, and capital formation.346 To the extent statutory 
analysis requirements applied, the court held that the SEC had fulfilled 
them, even though it had not considered whether the rule would achieve the 
intended humanitarian benefits.347 The court also held that the SEC did not 
act arbitrarily or capriciously in reaching its cost estimates.348 
Regardless of whether it was a statutory violation, the SEC’s failure to 
evaluate benefits in connection with this rulemaking runs directly counter to 
the guidance in the staff’s memorandum. However, because the rule’s 
humanitarian objective makes it atypical of SEC rules, the analysis 
employed with respect to that rulemaking may not shed much light on the 
SEC’s progress on economic analysis under the staff guidance. 
                                                                                                                 
 342. Conflict Minerals, Exchange Act Release No. 67,716, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,273, 56,335 (Sept. 
12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249(b)) [hereinafter Conflict Minerals Release]; 
Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 67,717, 77 
Fed. Reg. 56,365 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249). 
 343. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F. Supp. 2d 43, 56 (D.D.C. 2013) (footnote omitted) 
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f)). 
 344. Id. at 58 (citations omitted).  
 345. Id.  
 346. Id. at 58 n.15 (arguing that because Congress had already made a public interest 
determination, the SEC did not have to and that, absent an obligation to make a public interest 
finding, the SEC does not have an obligation to consider efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation).  
 347. Id. at 59.  
 348. Id. at 60–61.  
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B. SEC INSPECTOR GENERAL’S POST-GUIDANCE ASSESSMENT OF 
SEC ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
The inspector general of the SEC conducted a post-guidance assessment 
of SEC economic analysis, which included the conflicts mineral rule and 
eleven other rules.349 For eight of the twelve rules, the report found 
evidence that the SEC’s economists and the rule-writing teams collaborated 
in assessing the economic effects of the rule.350 However, some of the rules 
did not fully specify the baseline.351 Almost all of the rules discussed 
benefits and costs qualitatively, but they offered little quantification of costs 
beyond paperwork costs.352 Only one rule attempted to quantify benefits.353 
Only five of the twelve rules fully explained the reasons benefits and costs 
were not quantified.354 Nevertheless, the inspector general concluded that 
the SEC’s analysis “followed the spirit and intent” of the 2012 guidance.355 
The inspector general did make some recommendations for improvements 
in the SEC’s analysis, including “further incorporating specific elements in 
OMB Circular A-4 or practices that Federal administrative agencies have 
adopted.”356 
C. REPORT CARD ANALYSIS OF A POST-GUIDANCE REGULATION 
We suspect there may have been less improvement in the SEC’s 
economic analysis than the inspector general’s broad conclusion suggests. It 
is one thing to offer some discussion of the topics listed in the SEC’s 
guidance, such as potential justifications for the regulation or possible 
alternatives. It is quite another thing to offer a thorough, evidence-based 
analysis of the problem the regulation is supposed to solve, or to assess the 
benefits and costs of a wide range of different alternatives. To illustrate 
these differences, we used the Report Card methodology to assess the 
analysis accompanying the SEC’s Clearing Agency Standards rule, 
finalized in November 2012.357 
The Clearing Agency Standards rule is one of the rules included in the 
inspector general’s report.358 If the SEC’s economic analysis improved by 
the end of 2012, we would expect to see signs of that in this rule. The 
Clearing Agency Standards Rule set forth risk management standards for 
                                                                                                                 
 349. SEC OIG POST-GUIDANCE REPORT, supra note 336, at 10 (explaining that the review 
covered twelve rules, seven of which were reviewed “more in depth”). 
 350. Id. at 15.  
 351. Id. at 11.  
 352. Id. at 15.  
 353. Id.  
 354. Id. at 19.  
 355. Id. at i.  
 356. Id. at 34.  
 357. Clearing Agency Standards Release, supra note 72. 
 358. SEC OIG Post-Guidance Report, supra note 336, at app. VI (listing “Substantive Rules 
Examined”). 
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SEC-registered clearing agencies, which are part of the plumbing of the 
securities markets.359 Among other roles, clearing agencies serve as central 
counterparties, assuming the responsibilities of the seller to the buyer and 
vice versa.360 Because of the fundamental role of clearing agencies in the 
securities markets, the manner in which they are managed is particularly 
important and has long been a core SEC responsibility.361 Dodd-Frank only 
underscored the importance of this responsibility by mandating that many 
security-based swaps, which previously were cleared bilaterally, be cleared 
through a registered clearing agency and giving the SEC additional 
authority with respect to registered clearing agencies.362 
The Clearing Agency Standards rule comes in response to the SEC’s 
new Dodd-Frank authority. Registered clearing agencies are required to 
establish, implement, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures 
governing their operations and risk management.363 The rule sets forth 
minimum standards for clearing agencies that act as central counterparties 
(and thus are exposed to risk of financial loss if participants default on their 
obligations) in a number of areas including risk management, standards for 
membership, and recordkeeping and financial disclosure.364 The rule 
includes minimum standards for credit exposure monitoring, margin 
requirements, financial resources, margin model validation, membership 
standards, recordkeeping, and financial disclosures.365 The rule also 
requires registered clearing agencies to maintain written policies and 
procedures related to a number of other operational and risk management 
areas.366 
                                                                                                                 
 359. Clearing Agency Standards Release, supra note 72, at 66,220 (explaining that clearing 
agencies “have become an essential part of the infrastructure of the U.S. securities markets” and 
that “[t]he new rule establishes minimum requirements regarding how registered clearing agencies 
must maintain effective risk management procedures and controls as well as meet the statutory 
requirements under the Exchange Act on an ongoing basis”). 
 360. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Standards for Risk Management and Operations of 
Clearing Agencies (Oct. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Risk Management and Operations Press Release], 
available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171485518# 
.UwWZ-84gv_Y (“Clearing agencies generally act as middlemen to the parties in a securities 
transaction.”). 
 361. Clearing Agency Standards Release, supra 72, at 66,200 (describing the SEC’s nearly four 
decades of responsibility for facilitating securities clearance and settlement and noting that “[o]ver 
the years clearing agencies registered with the Commission have become an essential part of the 
infrastructure of the U.S. securities markets”). 
 362. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 701–814, 124 Stat. 1641–1822. 
 363. Clearing Agency Standards Release, supra note 72, at 66,228 (describing Rule 17Ad-22). 
 364. Risk Management and Operations Press Release, supra note 360 (“The rules would set 
standards with respect to measurement and management of credit exposures, margin requirements, 
financial resources and margin model validation. The rule also establishes certain recordkeeping 
and financial disclosure requirements for all registered clearing agencies as well as several new 
operational standards for these entities.”). 
 365. Clearing Agency Standards Release, supra note 72, at 66,230, 66,243 (describing Rule 
17Ad-22(b) and (c)). 
 366. Id. at 66,245 (describing Rule 17Ad-22(d)). 
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We chose to assess this particular rule, even though it is not a major 
rule, for several reasons. First, it was adopted long enough after the staff’s 
memorandum on economic analysis took effect to reflect the 
memorandum’s principles for economic analysis. Second, two of the major 
rules adopted after the guidance went into effect were joint rules with the 
CFTC.367 The other three major rules adopted after the guidance took effect 
and at the time we undertook this analysis all have unique features that 
would have complicated the SEC’s analysis.368 By contrast, the Clearing 
Agency Standards rule is well within the agency’s area of expertise and is a 
more routine SEC rulemaking. Finally, this rule is one of the more 
substantial rules finalized from June 2012 through mid-2013, when we 
selected a post-guidance rule for review.369 
The Report Card evaluation of the Clearing Agency Standards rule 
reveals little improvement in the quality of analysis. Table 5 shows that this 
rule achieved about the same total, openness, analysis, and use scores as the 
seven pre-2012 SEC rules assessed above. Turning to the five factors in the 
SEC guidance, the Clearing Agency Standards rule scored slightly better 





                                                                                                                 
 367. Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap 
Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, Securities Act 
Release No. 9338, Exchange Act Release No. 67,453, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 13, 2012) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 230, 240, 241); Further Definition of “Swap Dealer,” “Security-Based 
Swap Dealer,” “Major Swap Participant,” “Major Security-Based Swap Participant” and “Eligible 
Contract Participant,” Exchange Act Release No. 66,868, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,596 (May 23, 2012) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 240). 
 368. The first major rule related to the planned consolidated audit trail, a project that involves 
active participation by self-regulatory organizations such as the stock exchanges. The SEC 
directed these entities to develop a proposal and defers the related economic analysis. See 
Consolidated Audit Trail Release, supra note 207, at 45,726 (“A robust economic analysis of the 
next step—the actual creation and implementation of a consolidated audit trail itself—requires 
information on the plan’s detailed features (and their associated cost estimates) that will not be 
known until the SROs submit their [National Market System] plan to the Commission for its 
consideration. Accordingly, the Commission is deferring this analysis until such time as it may 
approve any NMS plan—that is, after the NMS plan, together with its detailed information and 
analysis, has been submitted by the SROs and there has been an opportunity for public 
comment.”). The other two major rules, one of which was discussed above, were Dodd-Frank 
rulemakings related to conflict minerals and companies engaged in resource extraction. Both of 
these rules are atypical of SEC rulemakings in terms of subject matter and degree of interest from 
affected entities and interest groups. See Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 342. 
 369. See, e.g., Purchase of Certain Debt Securities by Business and Industrial Development 
Companies Relying on Investment Company Act Exemption, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 30,268, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,117 (Nov. 23, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270) (replacing 
credit ratings with alternative standards of creditworthiness for entities relying on a single SEC 
exemption). 
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TABLE 5. REPORT CARD EVALUATION OF THE CLEARING AGENCY 
STANDARDS RULE COMPARED TO SEVEN PRE-2012 SEC RULES 
  




Total 15.7 17 
Openness 9.4 9 
Analysis 3.9 5 
Use 2.4 3 
Systemic Problem 0.7 1 
Baseline 0.6 2 
Alternatives 1.3 2 
Outcomes 0.9 1 
Cost-Benefit 1 1 
 
The Clearing Agency Standards rule scored better than average for 
analysis of the baseline because, unlike most of the other rules, it actually 
mentioned some baseline conditions relevant to one important aspect of the 
rule. In its discussion of clearing agencies’ risk management practices, the 
analysis provides a detailed description of current practices, which the SEC 
contends are largely consistent with the international standards on which 
the proposed regulation is based.370 This may be a case in which the 
regulatory analysis (identification of baseline practices and international 
standards) may have influenced the form of the rule. 
However, the SEC’s treatment of current industry practices (which it 
appears to regard as the baseline behavior that would continue in the 
absence of the new regulation) should only be the first step toward a 
projection of the practices the SEC expects to occur in the absence of new 
regulation and outcomes the SEC expects those practices to produce. The 
SEC’s own economic analysis guidance notes: 
An economic analysis of a proposed regulatory action compares 
the current state of the world, including the problem the rule is 
designed to address, to the expected state of the world with the 
proposed regulation (or regulatory alternatives) in effect. 
Economic impacts of proposed regulations are measured as the 
differences between these two scenarios.371 
The Clearing Agency Standards notice offers little insight into how current 
practices might change in the absence of the new regulation or the baseline 
level of risk associated with current practices. Thus, although the analysis 
offers somewhat more discussion of baseline conditions than the other 
regulations, the baseline analysis is far from complete. 
                                                                                                                 
 370. Clearing Agency Standards Release, supra note 72, at 66,266–71. 
 371. SEC Guidance, supra note 55, at 6–7. 
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This rule scored higher than average for analysis of alternatives solely 
due to its discussion of the baseline. In the Regulatory Report Card, 
analysis of the baseline is one component of the analysis of alternatives 
because the baseline should describe the outcomes expected under the “no 
new regulatory action” alternative.372 
The Clearing Agency Standards rule also received a noticeably higher 
score than most of the other SEC regulations that we reviewed on Report 
Card Criterion 9, which assesses the extent to which the regulatory agency 
claimed to use the analysis in its decisions. The rule received 3 points on 
this criterion; only one of the seven pre-2012 SEC rules scored as highly. 
This rule fared better than most others on use of analysis because it 
discussed, in a few paragraphs, the pros and cons of higher or lower net 
capital requirements for membership in a clearing agency.373 The 
Commission clearly tried to balance market power concerns against risk 
management, opting to set minimum net capital requirements at a level it 
hoped would encourage new entrants to become clearing agency members. 
Although the economic logic is clear, it is not clear how any economic 
calculation led the SEC to conclude that the specific figure chosen ($50 
million) is optimal. This is about the only instance in which the economic 
analysis appears to be used to make decisions about this rule. 
These very modest improvements in the baseline discussion and use of 
analysis may be harbingers of better things to come, or they may be random 
variations. Given that major federal rules and their accompanying analysis 
often take several years to develop, we believe any conclusions about the 
effects of the SEC’s 2012 economic analysis guidance would be premature 
at this early date. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In March 2012, the SEC pledged to improve its economic analysis in 
line with the principles enunciated in the executive orders that govern 
regulatory analysis by executive branch agencies. This is a positive and 
significant step for three reasons. First, the SEC opted to adopt the tried-
and-true analytical criteria that have guided diverse executive branch 
agencies for decades rather than trying to invent a new set of criteria from 
scratch. This means there are substantial opportunities to learn from “best 
practices” employed by executive branch agencies, including executive 
branch agencies that regulate financial markets. Second, the SEC’s 
guidance emphasizes the most fundamental aspects of regulatory impact 
analysis: assessment of the need for the regulation, identification of a 
baseline against which to measure the effects of the regulation, 
identification of reasonable alternatives, and an evaluation of the costs and 
                                                                                                                 
 372. Ellig & McLaughlin, supra note 82, at 870. 
 373. See Clearing Agency Standards Release, supra note 72, at 66,278. 
436 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 8 
benefits of the proposed regulation and the alternatives. Third, the SEC also 
pledged to involve its economists throughout the rule-development process 
rather than expecting them to produce an analysis after the major decisions 
on the rule have already been made. 
Evidence from pre-2012 rulemakings suggests that these were wise 
decisions. This Article has identified significant weaknesses in the SEC’s 
pre-2012 economic analysis. The SEC’s analyses read more like 
justifications of the final rule than careful analyses of the underlying 
problems and the various ways that those problems could be addressed. The 
economic analyses explored here failed, beyond sporadic references, to take 
advantage of the academic literature that would help them to analyze the 
rulemakings. Oftentimes the analyses deferred to the statute rather than 
asking fundamental questions about the need for and objectives of the 
rulemaking at issue. In designing many of these rules, the SEC did not 
appear to have a clear picture of what it was trying to achieve. The absence 
of a clear objective may be largely to blame for the haphazard nature of the 
economic analyses in these rules. The SEC often based cost-benefit 
estimates on speculation and failed altogether to seriously contend with 
potential indirect costs of the regulation. 
Our evaluation using the Mercatus Regulatory Report Card 
methodology found that the quality and use of regulatory analysis at the 
SEC prior to 2012 was significantly inferior to the quality and use of 
regulatory analysis by executive branch agencies. This occurred in spite of 
the fact that executive branch agencies themselves usually fall far short of 
the standards articulated in the executive orders. Most tellingly, executive 
branch agencies outscored the SEC on the Report Card criteria most 
directly relevant to the topics in the Commission’s new economic analysis 
guidance. These results suggest that the new guidance addresses significant 
problems in SEC economic analysis, and improvement should be a major 
priority. 
Were the SEC to conduct more thorough analysis, investors, regulated 
entities, Congress, and the Commission itself would benefit. Investors, who 
ultimately bear the costs of many regulations, would benefit from 
regulations that are more likely to be effective in solving real problems and 
more appropriately designed to satisfy a particular objective. Better analysis 
would also help to ensure that regulated entities target their compliance 
resources in the areas in which they would be most helpful at achieving the 
SEC’s objectives. More thoughtful, comprehensive analysis will also help 
the SEC to demonstrate to Congress the costs and benefits of the choices 
that Congress has made and thus provide Congress with the necessary 
information to make decisions about potential changes to legislative 
mandates. The SEC routinely contends that it does not have adequate 
resources to carry out its responsibilities. Better analysis will help it make 
better choices about how to spend the resources it has. 
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Our analysis provides a baseline against which the SEC’s rulemakings 
finalized after the SEC’s most recent staff guidance on economic analysis 
took effect. Once more regulations have been finalized pursuant to the 
memorandum’s guidance, examining whether and how the SEC’s analysis 
has improved will be a fruitful area for future research. 
Another fruitful area for research would be to examine how other 
independent regulatory agencies’ economic analyses compare with those of 
the SEC. As this Article demonstrates, an agency that is not committed to 
careful, well-supported, transparent economic analysis tends to base its 
rules on speculation and aspiration rather than a concrete understanding of 
the circumstances in which its rule will have to function. A more 
comprehensive economic analysis may be more costly to the agency in the 
short run, but in the long run it may significantly increase the benefits or 
reduce the costs of the regulations the Commission adopts. We anticipate 
that, as the SEC’s much-needed decision to retool its regulatory analysis 
takes hold, the agency, markets, and investors will reap the rewards. 
 
